President Trump’s decision to fire senior military leaders without cause is foolish and a disgrace. It politicizes our professional military in a dangerous and debilitating way. What frightens me even more is the removal of three judge advocates general, the most senior uniformed legal authorities in the Defense Department. Their removal is one more element of this administration’s attack on the rule of law, and an especially disturbing part.

Let us start with the senior officers. As secretary of the Air Force in the Biden administration, I worked closely with Gen. Charles Q. Brown Jr. for two years when he was chief of staff of the Air Force, and for more than a year when he was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In my entire 55 years of working in national security in many capacities, I have never known a steadier, wiser and more professional, patriotic or honorable officer than C.Q. Brown. Gen. James Slife and Adm. Lisa Franchetti are also extremely capable and professional officers whom I know well and deeply admire. They served for decades with honor and distinction over many administrations.

It pains me to see these fine people being treated so unfairly and, for the first time in my career, to see dedicated, apolitical military professionals being removed without cause. I am worried about political loyalty becoming a criterion to hold high military positions. For now, I have confidence that our professional military has nurtured dozens of highly qualified senior officers capable of holding positions of trust and responsibility, people who can provide leadership at the Pentagon and offer sound military advice to our civilian leaders.

But that optimism doesn’t extend to the consequences of removing the military’s top judge advocates general, the senior military professionals who interpret and enforce the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the rules that guide troops in the field. They have the independent legal authority to tell any military commander or political appointee that an order from the president or the secretary of defense is unlawful, cannot be given and should not be obeyed.

Of the three JAGs who were dismissed, I know Lt. Gen. Charles Plummer and worked with him for more than three years. His legal advice was always sound, professional and well supported. It is hard to imagine there was any reason to remove him, other than the obvious one of replacing him with someone more loyal to Mr. Trump and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth — and therefore more willing to interpret the law consistent with their desires.

If there is one characteristic of this president and this administration, it is the utter lack of respect for legal constraints. Mr. Trump has been clear about his views. Among many examples, he recently wrote, “He who saves his country does not violate any law.” It is clear from Mr. Hegseth’s confirmation hearing, public appearances, writings and support for convicted war criminals that he also does not believe JAG officers should constrain war fighters — or presumably the president and secretary of defense.

Mr. Trump and Mr. Hegseth will now get to choose the JAG leadership for all three military departments. One has to ask why JAG leadership was singled out for replacement. This is part of a much larger pattern of disrespect, even disdain, for the rule of law. We do not need JAG leaders who fit this pattern.

One of the most admirable characteristics of the American military is that all serving members are trained to understand that America stands for more than naked self-interest. Above all, it stands up for the Constitution and the rule of law, including the laws of armed conflict and those that restrict the use of the military against American citizens. Undermining those core principles is a disservice to our men and women in uniform and to everything America has stood for throughout my life. We are in danger when the legal constraints on how the president uses the military, including within the United States, are ignored or brushed aside.

My experiences with our JAG officers have always been positive. One stands out in particular. Years ago, I was an observer for the nonprofit organization Human Rights First at a legal proceeding for a detainee held at the military facility at Guantánamo Bay. In a briefing to observers and the media, the lead JAG defense attorney made a statement to the following effect: Whoever set up this prosecution system assumed that there would be quick trials with no meaningful defense by the assigned JAG officers. Those people did not understand JAG lawyers. We will support the rule of law and defend our clients, whomever they are.

I have never been prouder to be an American than I was in that moment. We will see if the new JAG leadership lives up to this standard.

Our country is in uncharted territory. We have an administration that is waging war against the rule of law. The evidence is everywhere. We don’t yet know how far it will go as it seeks to control, reinterpret, rewrite, ignore or defy legal constraints, including the Constitution itself. The replacement of the military JAG leadership is one skirmish in that war, but it’s time for the American people, across the political spectrum, to recognize what is happening. America has a rogue president and a rogue administration, and we need to acknowledge that and respond.

Hier een machinevertaling van deze laatste paragraaf:
Ons land bevindt zich op onbekend terrein. We hebben een regering die oorlog voert tegen de rechtsstaat. Het bewijs is overal. We weten nog niet hoe ver het zal gaan als het probeert de wettelijke beperkingen, inclusief de Grondwet zelf, te controleren, herinterpreteren, herschrijven, negeren of trotseren. De vervanging van de militaire leiding van de JAG is één schermutseling in die oorlog, maar het is tijd dat het Amerikaanse volk, in het hele politieke spectrum, onderkent wat er gebeurt. Amerika heeft een malafide president en een malafide regering, en we moeten dat erkennen en reageren.

Noot LT: Nooit eerder is een president van de VS in zo'n bewoordingen beschuldigd van malafide (lees: schurkachtige) praktijken. Kendall wijst erop dat de VS op weg zijn naar een dictatoriaal regime. De barrières die dat moeten voorkomen worden één voor één weggenomen. Of de wettelijke regels worden gewoonweg genegeerd. Wanneer ook de mogelijke opposanten geliquideerd of monddood zijn gemaakt, blijft enkel de verlammende angst over. En die angst staat elke reactie - waarvoor Kendall pleit - in de weg. Wij in Europa weten wat dat betekent. Het was immers de angst die de Duitsers in de pas deed lopen. En daarna de rest.

By Erik Kennes (20 December 2023)
Today is voting day in Kinshasa. While it is very likely that incumbent President Tshisekedi will be proclaimed the winner, the question is at what cost.

*****
On 5 December, the president of the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) requested important logistical assistance from the government to enable transportation of remaining election materials all over the country. The DRC government as well as the Angolan authorities agreed, but the operations became effective only on 17 December. The day before, the Security Council authorized MONUSCO to assist the CENI beyond its current area of deployment. Obviously, only a miracle can ensure a timely delivery and the organisation of elections all over DRC territory, beyond the urban centres.

Many technical problems have found unsatisfactory ad hoc solutions, seriously affecting the elections’ credibility. The voters lists were not published according to legal requirements but may be consulted at the local electoral offices. Many voters’ cards issued which were indecipherable were not replaced; the officers at the polling station will verify whether a voter has his name and picture on an (unpublished) list to decide whether the person is allowed to vote or not. Many problems the CENI was confronted with during the voters’ registration, such as defective machines and lack of trained personnel, may well occur again, due to last minute organisational challenges.

Lack of adequate communication and transparency from the CENI towards political parties and civil society is another factor affecting the credibility of the electoral process. Rumours abound about the likelihood of electoral fraud, and many are convinced that the incumbent President tries by all means – legal as well as illegal – to obtain a second presidential mandate.

Many actions from President Tshisekedi can indeed be considered as electorally motivated, such as his management of the crisis in the East (North and South Kivu and Ituri represent 19% of the registered voters), a Program for Local Development of all DRC’s 145 territories, or the appointment of allies at all election management institutions. His control of the territorial administration, the official media, and the security forces provides him an undeniable advantage. In several instances, efforts were made by officials of these institutions to block or sabotage opposition campaigns, especially targeting Moise Katumbi and Denis Mukwege. In Moanda, on 12 December, police forces even shot real bullets at a Katumbi meeting, while his party’s local youth league president was killed in Kindu on 27 November.

Tshisekedi’s campaign highlights the infrastructure he allegedly has built all over the country and brandishes the slogan “unity, security, prosperity”. The president’s program on paper is excellent and includes many innovative and interesting ideas, but the phasing of its actual implementation as well as its funding are not discussed. Critics say that the program is another chapter in the series of the President’s unrealised promises during his first mandate. This assessment may be an exaggeration, but the levels of impunity, corruption, parallel powers of the presidential family and the appointment of many natives from the President’s home area were hardly appreciated outside the presidential coalition “Sacred Union”.

The candidates’ programmes are unknown to the vast majority of the electorate and are therefore not at all part of the campaign. Instead, the Presidential coalition correctly identified the popular politician Moise Katumbi as the major electoral threat and therefore focused attention on nationality issues to discredit Katumbi’s presidential ambitions. Katumbi is the son of a Jewish father from Rhodos and a Congolese Bemba-Yeke mother. As the Bemba live across the DRC-Zambian border in both countries, and as Katumbi as a businessman has had many dealings in Zambia, he was quickly accused of being a Zambian national by members and supporters of the governing coalition. Images circulate of a “Zambian diplomatic passport” allegedly given to Katumbi on social media, but the Zambian authorities have officially denied any Zambian nationality. This seems like a replay of the Kabila presidency when Katumbi was accused of having the Italian nationality, which was denied by the Italian authorities. More problematic for the population in East-Congo is Katumbi’s spouse, who is the Tutsi daughter of a former Burundian ambassador of the Buyoya regime. This does not go down well among a substantial part of the population in Kivu with sharp anti-Tutsi attitudes. The substantially senseless propaganda on Katumbi’s nationality in combination with his wife’s ethnicity, may reduce his electoral support.

Fayulu very probably won the 2018 election because he de facto represented the electorally very strong Katumbi who was barred from participation at the time. Since then, Fayulu has played it alone and initially refused to participate in the elections, refusing to align candidates from his party for the National or Provincial Assemblies. He changed his mind to stand as a presidential candidate and appears to be convinced that he still enjoys nationwide support. Fayulu is the strongest candidate in the West and probably has important levels of support in the capital, but contrary to Katumbi, he lacks sufficient means to efficiently counter the massive electoral propaganda machine set up by the President’s coalition in Kinshasa and elsewhere, where Tshisekedi’s picture figures on almost each and every poster of candidates for the National Assembly, as well as on countless huge posters along the city’s main roads.

The other key presidential candidate is Dr. Denis Mukwege, yet his chances of electoral success are limited because he is virtually unknown in the western part of the country. As the symbol for political renewal and moral integrity, and with an uncompromising attitude towards the many aggressions by Rwanda since 1998, he enjoys the support of many civil society organizations in the East. He is still challenged on these issues by Tshisekedi who is also appreciated by many in the East for his uncompromising stance against Rwanda, despite the chaotic management of the crisis in the East by the DRC government.

In sum, everything is set for electoral chaos and for the results to be contested for lack of transparency of the entire process. For the same reasons and because of the technical and logistic challenges, many expect a high abstention rate. The activities of the electoral observation network organized by a coalition of the Catholic and Protestant churches will be crucial: in 2018 the results of their observation provided strong evidence of the electoral fraud committed. Now that the observation mission from the European Union is limited to a small team in Kinshasa, the Carter Center will be the only international organization able to credibly assess the official election results.

Unfortunately, the electoral process and the candidate selection for the national and provincial assembly went on almost unnoticed. With more than 25 000 candidates for 484 seats in the National Assembly and more than 44 000 for the 764 provincial assembly seats, the results will be massively contested before the constitutional court which has two months to examine the cases. If no decision is taken by the Court on a case, e.g. because of time constraints, the provisional result published by the electoral commission is considered final (art. 74 of the electoral law). Suspicion of electoral fraud such as that committed in 2018 can easily trigger violence.

Another often underestimated cause of violence is ethnic representation. Once a president comes to power, his ethnic group considers itself to be entitled to authority and power, to appointments at official functions. If the results of the National and Provincial elections were to display a disproportional presence of natives from the Kasai regions (Tshisekedi ethnic area) compared to their presence in their respective constituencies, this may easily trigger violent conflict. This is most important in the four ex-Katanga provinces where relations between natives from Katanga and Kasai have historically been conflictual. As the country is economically heavily dependent on the mines of Katanga, and the presidential family is very active in mining matters, a disproportional representation of Katanga by natives from Kasai will be interpreted as an effort by the latter to dominate the Katangese, in an already very tense situation.

Some analysts speculate on the possibility of a coup d’état during or after a chaotic election. The military strongman under the Kabila Presidency, John Numbi, called several times for a coup on social media and the former CENI president Corneille Nangaa, who orchestrated the 2018 electoral fraud, announced on 15 December the creation of a highly disturbing political platform of several rebel movements and armed groups in the East, including the M23. Although predictions are hard to make, a coup is not a guarantee for stability and may possibly lead to more violence. What seems sure already is that the 2023 elections will go down as the worst organized and the most contested of the entire electoral cycle started in 2006.

Mr. President, with your permission, I will make a small introduction and then ask my colleagues to brief the Security Council on the situation on the ground.

Excellencies,

The situation in the Middle East is growing more dire by the hour.
The war in Gaza is raging and risks spiralling throughout the region.
Divisions are splintering societies. Tensions threaten to boil over.
At a crucial moment like this, it is vital to be clear on principles -- starting with the fundamental principle of respecting and protecting civilians.
I have condemned unequivocally the horrifying and unprecedented 7 October acts of terror by Hamas in Israel.
Nothing can justify the deliberate killing, injuring and kidnapping of civilians – or the launching of rockets against civilian targets.
All hostages must be treated humanely and released immediately and without conditions. I respectfully note the presence among us of members of their families.

Excellencies,

It is important to also recognize the attacks by Hamas did not happen in a vacuum.
The Palestinian people have been subjected to 56 years of suffocating occupation.
They have seen their land steadily devoured by settlements and plagued by violence; their economy stifled; their people displaced and their homes demolished. Their hopes for a political solution to their plight have been vanishing.
But the grievances of the Palestinian people cannot justify the appalling attacks by Hamas. And those appalling attacks cannot justify the collective punishment of the Palestinian people.

Excellencies,

Even war has rules.
We must demand that all parties uphold and respect their obligations under international humanitarian law; take constant care in the conduct of military operations to spare civilians; and respect and protect hospitals and respect the inviolability of UN facilities which today are sheltering more than 600,000 Palestinians.
The relentless bombardment of Gaza by Israeli forces, the level of civilian casualties, and the wholesale destruction of neighborhoods continue to mount and are deeply alarming.
I mourn and honour the dozens of UN colleagues working for UNRWA – sadly, at least 35 and counting – killed in the bombardment of Gaza over the last two weeks.
I owe to their families my condemnation of these and many other similar killings.
The protection of civilians is paramount in any armed conflict.
Protecting civilians can never mean using them as human shields.
Protecting civilians does not mean ordering more than one million people to evacuate to the south, where there is no shelter, no food, no water, no medicine and no fuel, and then continuing to bomb the south itself.
I am deeply concerned about the clear violations of international humanitarian law that we are witnessing in Gaza.
Let me be clear: No party to an armed conflict is above international humanitarian law.

Excellencies,

Thankfully, some humanitarian relief is finally getting into Gaza.
But it is a drop of aid in an ocean of need.
In addition, our UN fuel supplies in Gaza will run out in a matter of days. That would be another disaster.
Without fuel, aid cannot be delivered, hospitals will not have power, and drinking water cannot be purified or even pumped.
The people of Gaza need continuous aid delivery at a level that corresponds to the enormous needs. That aid must be delivered without restrictions.
I salute our UN colleagues and humanitarian partners in Gaza working under hazardous conditions and risking their lives to provide aid to those in need. They are an inspiration.
To ease epic suffering, make the delivery of aid easier and safer, and facilitate the release of hostages, I reiterate my appeal for an immediate humanitarian ceasefire.

Excellencies,

Even in this moment of grave and immediate danger, we cannot lose sight of the only realistic foundation for a true peace and stability: a two-State solution.
Israelis must see their legitimate needs for security materialized, and Palestinians must see their legitimate aspirations for an independent State realized, in line with United Nations resolutions, international law and previous agreements.
Finally, we must be clear on the principle of upholding human dignity.
Polarization and dehumanization are being fueled by a tsunami of disinformation.
We must stand up to the forces of antisemitism, anti-Muslim bigotry and all forms of hate.

Mr. President,
Excellencies,
Today is United Nations Day, marking 78 years since the UN Charter entered into force.
That Charter reflects our shared commitment to advance peace, sustainable development and human rights.
On this UN Day, at this critical hour, I appeal to all to pull back from the brink before the violence claims even more lives and spreads even farther.

Thank you very much.

Felix Tshisekedi was sworn in as president on January 24, 2019, following longdelayed and disputed national elections, marred by widespread irregularities, voter suppression, violence, and interference from armed groups. More than a million Congolese were unable to vote in the presidential election because voting in three areas was postponed to March 2019, officially because of security and concerns over an Ebola outbreak in the east. At his swearing in, Tshisekedi said his administration would “guarantee to each citizen the respect of the exercise of their fundamental rights” and to end all forms of discrimination, promising that his government would prioritize “an effective and determined fight against corruption … impunity, bad governance, and tribalism.” His administration released most political prisoners and activists detained during the country’s protracted political crisis, and those living in exile were allowed to return home. In March, Tshisekedi removed Kalev Mutondo as director of the National Intelligence Agency, where he was a principal architect of former President Joseph Kabila’s administration’s drive to repress dissent. Many other senior security force officers, with long histories of involvement in serious human rights abuses, remained in their posts. Members of Kabila’s political coalition maintained a majority in parliament, as well as about two-thirds of the posts in the new government. Some of the most acute violence in the country in recent years took place in Yumbi, western Congo, in mid-December 2018 when at least 535 people were killed. Most of the victims were ethnic Banunu, killed by ethnic Batende. In eastern Congo, numerous armed groups, and in some cases government security forces, attacked civilians, killing and wounding many. The humanitarian situation remained alarming, with 4.5 million people internally displaced, and more than 890,000 people from Congo were registered as refugees and asylum seekers. Presidential Elections Tshisekedi’s victory over opposition candidate Martin Fayulu in the December 30, 2018 elections was disputed by an independent observation mission from the Catholic Church. Leaked data from the state-controlled electoral commission (Commission électorale nationale indépendante, CENI) and data gathered by the church showed that Fayulu won about 60 percent of the vote. Fayulu’s supporters from an array of opposition political parties protested in many cities across Congo. Security forces often responded to protests, some violent, with excessive, including unnecessary, lethal force. Security forces killed at least 10 people and injured dozens during protests after provisional results were announced on January 10. At least 28 people suffered gunshot wounds in Kikwit, Kananga, Goma, and Kisangani when security forces dispersed demonstrators. On the day after the elections, the government shut down internet and text messaging throughout the country, restricting independent reporting and information-sharing. The internet was restored on January 19.
Freedom of Expression and Peaceful Assembly
There has been a significant decline in political repression since Tshisekedi came to power. Many political prisoners and activists detained in previous years were freed, while activists and politicians in exile were allowed to return. However, some peaceful demonstrators continued to be arbitrarily detained or beaten by security forces. On June 30, Congo’s independence day, police fired live ammunition, killing one person, during opposition protests in Goma against corruption and election fraud. In July, security forces evicted thousands of illegal miners from a copper and cobalt mine in Kolwezi, Lualaba province, sparking protests outside the governor’s office and looting of shops. Attacks on Civilians by Armed Groups and Government Forces More than 130 armed groups were active in eastern Congo’s North Kivu and South Kivu provinces, attacking civilians. The groups included the largely Rwandan Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and allied Congolese Nyatura groups, the largely Ugandan Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), the Nduma Defense of Congo-Renové (NDC-R), the Mazembe and Yakatumba Mai Mai groups, and several Burundian armed groups. Many of their commanders have been implicated in war crimes, including ethnic massacres, rape, forced recruitment of children, and pillage. According to the Kivu Security Tracker, which documents violence in eastern Congo, assailants, including state security forces, killed at least 720 civilians and abducted or kidnapped for ransom more than 1,275 others in North Kivu and South Kivu in 2019. Beni territory, North Kivu province, remained an epicenter of violence, with about 253 civilians killed in more than 100 attacks by various armed groups, including the ADF. At least 257 civilians were kidnapped in Rutshuru territory, North Kivu province, often by armed groups. The Fizi and Uvira highlands in South Kivu saw fighting between the mainly ethnic Banyamulenge Ngumino armed group and allied self-defense groups, and Mai Mai groups, comprising fighters from the Bafuliro, Banyindu, and Babembe communities, with civilians often caught in the middle. Clashes between armed groups in the South Kivu highlands surged in February, displacing an estimated 200,000 people over the following months. In early June, violence resurfaced in parts of northeastern Congo’s Ituri province, where armed assailants launched deadly attacks on villages, killing over 200 civilians and displacing an estimated 300,000 people. At least 28 displaced people were killed in Ituri in September. Justice and Accountability In July, a three-judge panel at the International Criminal Court (ICC) unanimously found the rebel leader and former army general Bosco Ntaganda guilty of 13 counts of war crimes and 5 counts of crimes against humanity committed in Ituri in 2002 and 2003. The charges included murder and attempted murder, rape, sexual slavery, attacking civilians, pillaging, displacement of civilians, attacking protected objects, and recruiting and using child soldiers. The judges found that Ntaganda and others agreed on a common plan to attack and drive the ethnic Lendu population out of Ituri through the commission of crimes. In November, the ICC sentenced him to 30 years in prison. Troops under Ntaganda’s command also committed ethnic massacres, killings, rape, torture, and recruitment of child soldiers in the Kivus, including when Ntaganda commanded troops in the Rwandan-backed National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP) and M23 armed groups, and while he served as a general in the Congolese army. His trial at the ICC only dealt with crimes related to the Ituri conflict. The Congolese army announced on September 18 that its forces killed Sylvestre Mudacumura, the FDLR’s military commander, and some of his lieutenants. Mudacumura had been wanted by the ICC since 2012 for nine counts of war crimes. The Congolese trial, which started in June 2017, into the murders of United Nations investigators Michael Sharp and Zaida Catalán and the disappearance of the four Congolese who accompanied them in March 2017 in the central Kasai region was ongoing at time of writing. In February, a military court in Goma found Marcel Habarugira, a former Congolese army soldier turned warlord, guilty of the war crimes of rape and use of child soldiers committed while leading a faction of an armed group known as Nyatura (“hit hard” in Kinyarwanda). Habarugira received a 15-year prison sentence. His group, which received arms and training from Congolese army officers, carried out many atrocities in 2012. A trial against Congolese security force members arrested for allegedly using excessive force to quash a protest in Kamanyola, eastern Congo, in September 2017, during which 38 Burundian asylum seekers were killed, and more than 100 others wounded, started on June 28 and was ongoing at time of writing. Six members of the security forces faced charges of murder and attempted murder before a military court in Bukavu, South Kivu province. The trial of Nduma Defense of Congo (NDC) militia leader Ntabo Ntaberi Sheka, who surrendered to the UN peacekeeping mission in Congo (MONUSCO), began on November 27, 2018 and was ongoing at time of writing. Sheka was implicated in numerous atrocities in eastern Congo, and he had been sought on a Congolese arrest warrant since 2011 for alleged crimes against humanity, including mass rape. On June 7, Congolese authorities issued an arrest warrant against warlord Guidon Shimary Mwissa, Sheka’s former deputy and the leader of Nduma Defense of Congo-Rénové (NDC-R) armed group, which has been responsible for widespread attacks on civilians in North Kivu. He is wanted for “participation in an insurrectional movement,” “war crimes by child recruitment,” and “crimes against humanity by rape.” Despite these allegations, NDC-R continued to collaborate with the Congolese army in the area the group controls, which is larger than that of any other armed group in Congo. Human Rights Watch was unaware of any attempt by Congolese authorities or UN peacekeepers to arrest Guidon. He was sanctioned in 2018 by the UN Security Council and the United States. Congo’s military justice officials investigated the December 2018 Yumbi killings—in which at least 535 people were killed—and arrested dozens of suspected assailants and instigators. A trial was yet to start at time of writing. Key International Actors In February, the US State Department imposed visa restrictions on three electoral commission senior officials, the then-president of the national assembly, and the president of the Constitutional Court, accusing them of corruption and obstructing the presidential election. In March, the US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) imposed financial sanctions on the same three electoral commission officials. In May, justice ministers attending the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region meeting in Kenya said that greater efforts were needed to “uphold human rights, promote justice, and eradicate impunity.” To achieve these goals, they approved a series of specific recommendations. In March, the Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution extending the mandate of MONUSCO for nine months and called for an independent strategic review of the mission.

"Art reminds us of the impossibility of his death and leaves us horrified every time one remembers the tragedy.", Matthias De Groof, editor 'Lumumba in the Arts'

Lumumba as a symbol of decolonisation and as an icon in the arts

It is no coincidence that a historical figure such as Patrice Emery Lumumba, independent Congo’s first prime minister, who was killed in 1961, has lived in the realm of the cultural imaginary and occupied an afterlife in the arts. After all, his project remained unfinished and his corpse unburied. The figure of Lumumba has been imagined through painting, photography, cinema, poetry, literature, theatre, music, sculpture, fashion, cartoons and stamps, and also through historiography and in public space. No art form has been able to escape and remain indifferent to Lumumba. Artists observe the memory and the unresolved suffering that inscribed itself both upon Lumumba’s body and within the history of Congo. If Lumumba – as an icon – lives on today, it is because the need for decolonisation does as well.

Rather than seeking to unravel the truth of actual events surrounding the historical Lumumba, this book engages with his representations. What is more, it considers every historiography as inherently embedded in iconography. Film scholars, art critics, historians, philosophers, and anthropologists discuss the rich iconographic heritage inspired by Lumumba. Furthermore, Lumumba in the Arts offers unique testimonies by a number of artists who have contributed to Lumumba's polymorphic iconography, such as Marlene Dumas, Luc Tuymans, Raoul Peck, and Tshibumba Kanda Matulu, and includes contributions by such highly acclaimed scholars as Johannes Fabian, Bogumil Jewsiewicky, and Elikia M’Bokolo.

Contributors: Balufu Bakupa-Kanyinda (artist), Karen Bouwer (University of San Francisco), Véronique Bragard (UCLouvain), Piet Defraeye (University of Alberta), Matthias De Groof (scholar/filmmaker), Isabelle de Rezende (independent scholar), Marlene Dumas (artist), Johannes Fabian (em., University of Amsterdam), Rosario Giordano (Università della Calabria), Idesbald Goddeeris (KU Leuven), Gert Huskens (ULB), Robbert Jacobs (artist), Bogumil Jewsiewicki (em., Université Laval), Tshibumba Kanda Matulu (artist), Elikia M’Bokolo (EHESS), Christopher L. Miller (Yale University), Pedro Monaville (NYU), Raoul Peck (artist), Pierre Petit (ULB), Mark Sealy (Autograph ABP), Julien Truddaïu (CEC), Léon Tsambu (University of Kinshasa), Jean Omasombo Tshonda (Africa Museum), Luc Tuymans (artist), Mathieu Zana Etambala (AfricaMuseum)

This publication is GPRC-labeled (Guaranteed Peer-Reviewed Content).

How the Jesuits re-emerged after forty years of suppression

In 1773, Pope Clement XIV suppressed the Society of Jesus. For the 823 Jesuits living in the Low Countries, it meant the end of their institutional religious life. In the Austrian Netherlands, the Jesuits were put under strict surveillance, but in the Dutch Republic they were able to continue their missionary work. It is this regional contrast and the opportunities it offered for the Order to survive that make the Low Countries an exceptional and interesting case in Jesuit history.

Just as in White Russia, former Jesuits and new Jesuits in the Low Countries prepared for the restoration of the Order, with the help of other religious, priests, and lay benefactors. In 1814, eight days before the restoration of the Society by Pope Pius VII, the novitiate near Ghent opened with eleven candidates from all over the United Netherlands. Barely twenty years later, the Order in the Low Countries – by then counting one hundred members – formed an independent Belgian Province. A separate Dutch Province followed in 1850. Obviously, the reestablishment, with new churches and new colleges, carried a heavy survival burden: in the face of their old enemies and the black legends they revived, the Jesuits had to retrieve their true identity, which had been suppressed for forty years.

Contributors: Peter van Dael, SJ (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam & Pontifical Gregorian University Rome), Pierre Antoine Fabre (École des hautes études en sciences sociales Paris), Joep van Gennip (Tilburg School of Catholic Theology), Michel Hermans, SJ (University of Namur), Marek Inglot, SJ (Pontifical Gregorian University Rome), Frank Judo (lawyer Brussels), Leo Kenis (KU Leuven) Marc Lindeijer, SJ (Bollandist Society Brussels), Jo Luyten (KADOC-KU Leuven), Kristien Suenens (KADOC-KU Leuven), Vincent Verbrugge (historian)

This publication is GPRC-labeled (Guaranteed Peer-Reviewed Content).

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The company was formed as Independent Newspapers Limited in 1904 by William Martin Murphy, as the publisher of the Irish Independent.

In 1973 (Sir) Tony O'Reilly acquired 100% of the "A" shares of the company from the Murphy and Chance families, and was later forced to bid for the "B" (non-voting) shares. The company was subsequently floated on the Irish Stock Exchange and London Stock Exchange. The group expanded overseas, acquiring interests in the UK, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa.

In 1999, the company name was changed to Independent News and Media plc.

O'Reilly was CEO until early 2009, one of his sons, formerly COO, Gavin O'Reilly, became CEO in early 2009, and two others were non-executive directors for many years. O'Reilly himself resigned as CEO on 19 April 2012 and was replaced by Vincent Crowley. O'Reilly had come under pressure in recent months from two of INM's largest shareholders, billionaire Denis O'Brien and financier Dermot Desmond.

As of May 2012, Irish entrepreneur Denis O'Brien holds a 29.9% stake in the company,[8] making him the largest shareholder. This compares to O'Reilly's family stake of around 13% (June 2012).[9] 5% of the holding company is held by Clear Channel Communications, transferred in return for control of a South African outdoor advertising firm.

On 26 April 2013, INM announced it had concluded a deal with its bankers to exchange part of its debt for up to 20 per cent of equity. The deal was subject to the sale of its South African newspapers, a reduction in staff levels of 10%, a capital raising, and the restructuring of the company's pension plan.

In 2019, it was reported that INM was up for sale. According to reports, suitors include Schibsted, Sanoma Media and a private equity firm.

In April of 2019 it was reported that INM had accepted an ownership bid of €145.6 million from Belgian media group Mediahuis. The offer is subject to acceptance by shareholders, competition authority approval and government approval.

more info on the site of INM

Brussels, 11 February 2019

The Working Group of Experts on People of African Descent thanks the Government of Belgium for its invitation to visit the country from 4 to 11 February 2019, and for its cooperation. In particular, we thank the Federal Public Service Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation. We also thank the OHCHR Regional Office for Europe for their support to the visit.
The views expressed in this statement are of a preliminary nature and our final findings and recommendations will be presented in our mission report to the United Nations Human Rights Council in September 2019.
During the visit, the Working Group assessed the human rights situation of people of African descent living in Belgium, and gathered information on the forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, Afrophobia and related intolerance they face. The Working Group studied the official measures taken and mechanisms to prevent systemic racial discrimination and to protect victims of racism, as well as responses to multiple forms of discrimination.
As part of its fact-finding mission, the Working Group visited Brussels, Antwerp, Liege, Namur and Charleroi. It met with senior officials of the Belgian Government at the federal, regional, community and local levels, the legislature, law enforcement, national human rights institutions, OHCHR Regional Office, non-governmental organizations, as well as communities and individuals working to promote the rights of people of African descent in Belgium. The Working Group toured the Royal Museum for Central Africa (RMCA). It also visited the St. Gilles prison in Brussels.
We thank the many people of African descent and others, representing civil society organizations, human rights defenders, women’s organizations, lawyers, and academics whom we met during the visit. The contributions of those working to promote and protect the rights of people of African descent, creating initiatives, and proposing strategies to address structural racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, Afrophobia and related intolerance are invaluable.
The protection of human rights and the prohibition of racial discrimination is enshrined in Articles 10-11 in the Belgian Constitution. Belgium’s national anti-racism legislation is the 1981 anti-discrimination law, updated in 2007. Regions and communities also have anti-discrimination legislation.
We welcome the initiatives undertaken by Government at the federal, regional and community levels to combat racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance. We encourage efforts to raise awareness and support civil society including through the provision of funding.
The Working Group recognizes the important work of the Inter-Federal Centre for Equal Opportunities (Unia) in the protection and promotion of human rights, and in documenting racism and inequality at the federal and regional levels. Unia also provides recommendations on participation, tolerance, discrimination and diversity as well as their implementation in Belgium. Its diversity barometers provide important information on the human rights situation of people of African descent.
Throughout our visit we appreciated the willingness of public officials to discuss how public and private institutions may sustain racial disparities. We welcome the national network of expertise on crime against people, a robust infrastructure for combatting hate crime. In Brussels, Antwerp, Liege, Namur and Charleroi, the Working Group received information about social integration and intercultural efforts for new arrivals, including referral to language tuition. In Liege, we welcome the commitment enshrined in the Charter, Liege Against Racism.
The Working Group also welcomes the civil society initiatives to promote the International Decade for people of African descent in Belgium.
One of the ways the African diaspora in Belgium is expressing its voice is through cultural events such as the Congolisation festival to highlight the contribution of Congolese artists to the Belgian cultural landscape and make people begin to appreciate and reflect on the diaspora’s artistic heritage.
Despite the positive measures referred to above, the Working Group is concerned about the human rights situation of people of African descent in Belgium who experience racism and racial discrimination.
There is clear evidence that racial discrimination is endemic in institutions in Belgium. Civil society reported common manifestations of racial discrimination, xenophobia, Afrophobia and related intolerance faced by people of African descent. The root causes of present day human rights violations lie in the lack of recognition of the true scope of violence and injustice of colonisation. As a result, public discourse does not reflect a nuanced understanding of how institutions may drive systemic exclusion from education, employment, and opportunity. The Working Group concludes that inequalities are deeply entrenched because of structural barriers that intersect and reinforce each other. Credible efforts to counter racism require first overcoming these hurdles.
We note with concern the public monuments and memorials that are dedicated to King Leopold II and Force Publique officers, given their complicity in atrocities in Africa. The Working Group is of the view that closing the dark chapter in history, and reconciliation and healing, requires that Belgians should finally confront, and acknowledge, King Leopold II’s and Belgium’s role in colonization and its long-term impact on Belgium and Africa.
The most visible postcolonial discourse in a Belgian public institution takes place within the recently reopened Royal Museum for Central Africa (RMCA), which is both a research and a cultural institution. RMCA has sought to review its approach to include critical, postcolonial analysis- a marked shift for an institution originally charged with promulgating colonial propaganda. The Working Group is of the view that the reorganization of the museum has not gone far enough. For those communities that do engage in vibrant postcolonial discourse, i.e., civil society and activists, the reorganization falls short of its goal of providing adequate context and critical analysis. The Working Group notes the importance of removing all colonial propaganda and accurately presenting the atrocities of Belgium’s colonial past. The RMCA admits that decolonization is a process and reports its intention to evolve towards sharing power with people and institutions of African descent.
The Working Group welcomes this process of decolonization, as even recent cultural production in Belgium reflects enduring legacies of the colonial past. For example, a 2002 exhibit of eight Africans in a private zoo in Belgium (Cameroonians brought to Belgium without visas) recalls Belgium’s notorious “human zoos” between 1897 and 1958.
Reportedly, between 1959 and 1962, thousands of children born to white fathers and African mothers in Belgian-ruled Congo, Rwanda and Burundi were abducted and sent to Belgium for adoption. The Working Group notes with approval that the 2016 appeal by Metis de Belgique for state recognition was met with an apology from the Catholic Church the following year and a 2018 parliamentary resolution on la ségrégation subie par les métis issus de la colonisation belge en Afrique. The Working Group commends the provision of funding for data gathering, research and accountability within this framework.
Belgium often refers to intercultural, rather than multicultural, goals with the idea of preserving individual cultural heritage and practices while coexisting in peace and prosperity with respect and regard for the intersection and interaction of diverse cultures. This diversity includes citizens, migrants, people of first, second, and third generation residency, highly educated people, and groups that have contributed enormously to the modern Belgian state. Interculturality requires reciprocity, rejection of harmful cultural stereotype, and valuing of all cultures, including those of people of African descent.
The Working Group notes with concern the absence of disaggregated data based on ethnicity or race. Disaggregated data is required for ensuring the recognition of people of African descent and overcoming historical “social invisibility”. Without such data, it is impossible to ensure that Belgium’s reported commitments to equality are actually realized. Some anti-discrimination bodies have found proxy data (relating to parental origin) that have informed equality and anti-racism analyses; additional data relating to regroupement famille (and other data) may also extend these analyses to Belgian citizens of African descent.
Belgium has a complex political system. This must not impede fulfilment of its obligations to combat racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance. The lack of an A-Status National Human Rights Institution and a National Action Plan to combat racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, Afrophobia and related intolerance must be addressed. Belgium should engage actively in partnership with people of African descent, particularly experts in navigating these complexities, to promote equality and to diminish entrenched racial disparity.
The Working Group notes both civil society and law enforcement acknowledge the prevalence of racial profiling in policing. Reportedly, counter-terrorism policies have contributed to an increase in racial profiling by law enforcement. The federal police recognized the concern with racial profiling and offered additional information about a pilot study in Mechelen to document all stops and searches (including a narrative basis for the stop) over a two-year period. However, it is unclear how this may effectively target racial profiling as the race of the community members stopped by the police are not included among the data captured by the stop report.
The Working Group visited St. Gilles Prison in Brussels. The Working Group found the prison dilapidated and overcrowded. It is scheduled for relocation in 2022. Frequent strikes by prison personnel dramatically impact the conditions of confinement for incarcerated people housed there, including suspensions of visitation, showers, phone access, recreation, and prolonged lockdowns. Another concern raised by the detainees was the lack of attention to their requests for medical attention. There were also individual reports of racist behaviour by some of the guards, and the administration committed to individually counselling perpetrators and zero-tolerance for racism.
The Working Group notes with deep concern, the lack of representation of people of African descent in the judiciary, law enforcement, government service, correctional service, municipal councils, regional and federal parliaments. These institutions do not reflect the diversity of the Belgian population. When the Working Group visited Belgium in 2005, the federal police reported the existence of a robust recruitment program to promote diversity. While this program was again presented as a serious commitment, no data are currently available to establish what improvements, if any, had been made in the past fourteen years and whether the program has been successful.
Civil society and community members commented on the lack of positive role models in the news media, on billboards, and in Belgian television and film. The French Community referenced best practices involving a barometer of print media aimed at measuring equality and diversity among journalists and in news content, and creating of an expert panel to broaden representation.
The Working Group noted deficiencies in the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights, among people of African descent in Belgium. According to research, sixty percent of Afro-Belgians are educated to degree level, but they are four times more likely to be unemployed than the national average. Eighty percent say they have been victims of discrimination from a very young age. Public officials consistently rationalized systematic exclusion of people of African descent with references to language and culture, even in cases involving second generation Belgians.
The Working Group repeatedly heard from civil society that Belgians of African descent faced “downgrading” and other employment challenges. People with university and graduate degrees reported working well-below their educational levels, including in manual labor despite possessing university certificates from Belgian universities. They also highlighted the difficulty in obtaining recognition of foreign diplomas. They also reported systematic exclusion from job assistance as job centers declined to refer people of African descent to employment opportunities at their educational levels. UNIA has also documented pervasive downgrading of employment and the prevalence of people of African descent working well below their education levels, despite the fact that they are among the most educated in the Belgian society.
The Working Group is concerned that primary and secondary school curricula do not adequately reflect the history of colonization as well as history and contributions of people of African descent in Belgium. Whether colonial history of Belgium is mentioned is largely dependent on interest and initiative of individual teachers. Where curriculum exists, it appears to recapitulate colonial propaganda including the suggestion that economic development came to Africa as a result of colonization while omitting references to key historical figures of African descent such as Patrice Lumumba. Reportedly, one-fourth of the high school graduates are unaware that Congo was a former Belgian colony.
At every interaction with civil society, the Working Group heard testimonies of the systematic practice of diverting children of African descent to vocational or manual training and out of the general education trajectory. This severely impacts the right to education and the right to childhood. Parents reported struggling to keep their children from being diverted, resisting transfers to vocational education, fighting to avoid having their children classified with behavioural or learning disorders and being threatened with the involvement of child protective services. A few parents discussed creative strategies to navigate these systems and secure their children’s education, including using the home school testing process and enrolling their children in boarding school. University students also reported being discouraged from continuing their educations or progressing.
Several community members discussed severe impact to their mental health due to racial discrimination. This included individualized racial slurs and hostile treatment, and several members of civil society in different locations mentioned the dramatic impact of daily racism on their lives – including depression and becoming withdrawn – and the fact that no one in authority in their schools ever noticed or intervened.
Civil society reported frequent discrimination in housing and rental markets. They would be immediately rejected by landlords who could detect an African accent over the phone or who recognized their names as African or informed the apartment was unavailable once they met the landlord face-to-face. Government informed of the use of “mystery calls,” a process involving the use of testers where landlords were identified as potentially discriminating unlawfully. The program was only recently commenced, pursuant to the Unia report and in conjunction with them, and few cases had been completed at the time of our visit.
The Working Group heard considerable testimony from civil society and community members on intersectionality, that people who meet the criteria for multiple marginalized groups may be particularly vulnerable, face extreme violence and harassment, and yet often remain invisible or deprioritized even within communities of African descent. This is particularly true for undocumented people of African descent whose lives are particularly precarious and who lack regularisation for years. In addition, women of African descent, particularly recent migrants, faced challenges pursuing justice, social support, or even shelter for domestic violence.
People of African descent and Muslim religious identity questioned why law enforcement authorities assumed they had terrorist ties. Some public officials implicitly acknowledged their role in this, including defending the use of racial profiling as a counter terrorism tactic and suggesting a false equivalence between anti-radicalism efforts and anti-racism programs, i.e., failing to understand that race-based assumptions regarding radicalism are inaccurate, grounded in bias, and divert key resources from protecting Belgian society from actual threats.
The Working Group is concerned about the rise of populist nationalism, racist hate speech and xenophobic discourse as a political tool. We reiterate the concerns raised by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in 2015 that the government has yet to adopt legislation declaring organizations which promote and incite racial discrimination illegal, in conformity with Article 4 of the Convention.
The use of blackface, racialized caricatures, and racist representations of people of African descent is offensive, dehumanizing and contemptuous. Regrettably, the re-publication of Tintin in the Congo unedited and without contextualization perpetuates negative stereotypes and either should be withdrawn or contextualized with an addendum reflecting current commitments to anti-racism.
The Working Group found little awareness about the International Decade for people of African descent. Civil society stands ready to support implementation of the Programme of Activities of the International Decade.
The following recommendations are intended to assist Belgium in its efforts to combat all forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, Afrophobia and related intolerance:
The Government of Belgium should adopt a comprehensive inter-federal National Action Plan against racism, upholding the commitments it made 2002, following the World Conference Against Racism. The National Action Plan against racism should be developed in partnership with people of African descent.
Adopt a National Strategy for the inclusion of people of African descent in Belgium, including migrants, and create a National Platform for people of African descent.
Establish an independent National Human Rights Institution, in conformity with the Paris Principles, and in partnership with people of African descent.
The Government should consider ratifying the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families.
The Working Group urges the Government to comply with the recommendations made by the Unia, including those relating to combating racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance.
The Working Group urges the government to fund creative projects by people of African descent such as the House of African Culture, among others, with the view of raising the visibility of all forms of African expression and preserving the history and memory of the African Diaspora.
We urge universities throughout Belgium to endow chairs in African Studies, and prioritize the hiring of faculty of African descent, with the view to foster research and the dissemination of knowledge in this area, as well as to diversify the academy.
The Government should ensure funding for anti-racism associations run by people of African descent to enable them to be partners in combatting racism. The Working Group also recommends inclusive financing mechanisms for entrepreneurs of African Descent.
We welcome the renaming of the former Square du Bastion to Patrice Lumumba Square in June 2018 as well as an exhibit commemorating Congolese soldiers who fought in World War I, and encourage further, durable commemoration of contributions of people of African descent and the removal of markers of the colonial period.
We urge the government to give recognition and visibility to those who were killed during the period of colonization, to Congolese soldiers who fought during the two World Wars, and to acknowledge the cultural, economic, political and scientific contributions of people of African descent to the development of Belgian society through the establishment of monuments, memorial sites, street names, schools, municipal, regional and federal buildings. This should be done in consultation with civil society.
The Working Group recommends reparatory justice, with a view to closing the dark chapter in history and as a means of reconciliation and healing. We urge the government to issue an apology for the atrocities committed during colonization. The right to reparations for past atrocities is not subject to any statute of limitations. The Working Group recommends the CARICOM 10-point action plan for reparatory justice as a guiding framework.
The Working Group supports the establishment of a truth commission, and supports the draft bill before Parliament entitled “A memorial work plan to establish facts and the implication of Belgian institutions in Congo, Rwanda and Burundi”, dated 14 February 2017.
The authorities should ensure full access to archives relevant for research on Belgian colonialism.
The Working Group urges the relevant authorities to ensure that the RMCA be entrusted with tasks and responsibilities in the context of the International Decade for people of African Descent. In this context, the Working Group recommends that the RMCA be provided with appropriate financial and human resources, which would allow it to fully exercise the potential of this institution and engage in further improving and enriching its narrative, thus contributing to a better awareness and understanding of the tragic legacies of Belgian colonialism as well as past and contemporary human rights challenges of people of African descent.
The Working Group encourages the RMCA, in collaboration with historians from Africa and the diaspora, to remove all offensive racist exhibits and ensure detailed explanations and context to inform and educate visitors accurately about Belgium’s colonial history and its exploitation of Africa.
The Working Group urges the Government to provide specific, directed funding to the RMCA to enrich its postcolonial analysis. This funding should allow for innovations like QR codes on museum placards to provide more context and enrich intersectional analyses, including the historical and current interplay of race, gender, sexuality, migration status, religion and other relevant criteria.
The Working Group urges the Government to financially support a public education campaign in partnership with people of African descent, to learn and better understand the legacies of Belgian colonialism.
The Working Group strongly recommends that the Government collects, compiles, analyses, disseminates and publishes reliable statistical data disaggregated by race and on the basis of voluntary self-identification, and undertakes all necessary measures to assess regularly the situation of individuals and groups of individuals who are victims of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance.
The Working Group calls on the Government to address racial profiling and institute a policy of documenting and analyzing stops and searches nationwide, including race and skin color, in order to promote and ensure equality and fairness on policing; mitigate selective enforcement of the law; address enduring bias, stereotype, and beliefs about the need to surveil and control people of African descent.
Ensure that the robust framework set up for the prosecution of hate crimes is used more in practice.
Review diversity initiatives within justice institutions as well as other sectors including education and media, to develop clear benchmarks to increase diversity measurably and overcome structural discrimination and unconscious bias through positive measures, in accordance with the provisions of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.
Clarify and simplify jurisdiction of anti-discrimination authorities, creating one point of entry to ease reporting for victims and to coordinate and enhance accountability for perpetrators of racist harassment and violence, including accelerated judicial procedures.
The Government should review and ensure that textbooks and educational materials accurately reflect historical facts as they relate to past tragedies and atrocities such as enslavement, the trade in enslaved Africans and colonialism. Belgium should use UNESCO’s General History of Africa to inform its educational curriculum, among similarly oriented authoritative texts. We urge the government to promote greater knowledge and recognition of and respect for the culture, history and heritage of people of African descent living in Belgium. This should include the mandatory teaching of Belgium’s colonial history at all levels of the education system.
The Ministries of Education and the local Communities must determine whether there is a statistically significant difference in diversion of children of African descent from mainstream education into vocational or technical education streams, as compared to white Belgian children.
All teachers should complete anti-racism training, including training on implicit bias and specific manifestations in the context of their work. The training should involve testing to evaluate the understanding of diversity among teachers.
All public officials charged with education responsibilities must develop clear, objective, and transparent processes and criteria that govern when a child should be diverted from mainstream education, the need to guard against implicit bias and race-based outcomes in decision-making, and the right of parents to resist or overrule the recommendations of teachers without harassment.
The Government should take all necessary measures to combat racial discrimination and ensure full implementation of the right to adequate standard of living, including the right to adequate housing, access to affordable health care, employment and education for people of African descent.
Invest in integrated trust-building measures between the police, judicial institutions, the Unia, social integration institutions, anti-racist associations, and victims of racial discrimination and race and gender based violence, to ensure that racist acts, violence or crimes are systematically reported, prosecuted and compensated.
Belgium should conduct a racial equity audit within its public institutions and incentivize private employers and institutions to do the same. The purpose of the audit is to look for systemic bias and discrimination within the regular and routine operation of business. Belgium should commit to a public release of the findings and to implementing recommendations developed in the audit process.
Belgium should examine existing statistics and proxy data to determine whether people of African descent in Belgium, including Belgian citizens of African descent, experience and exercise their human rights consistently with the averages for all Belgians. This includes data on citizenship, parents’ place of birth, and regroupement famille (family reunification) data for reunification from countries of African descent.
Belgium should adopt clear, objective, and transparent protocols for job centers to ensure they do not perpetuate stereotype and bias, including requiring referrals to be based on level of education or experience, and recognizing that language should not be a disqualifying factor once a measurable competence is determined.
The Working Group recommends the Government support and facilitate an open debate on the use of blackface, racialized caricatures and racist representation of people of African descent. The republication of Tintin in the Congo should be withdrawn or contextualized with an addendum reflecting current commitments to anti-racism.
The Working Group calls on politicians at all levels of society to avoid instrumentalzing racism, xenophobia and hate speech in the pursuit of political office and to encourages them to promote inclusion, solidarity, non-discrimination and meaningful commitments to equality. Media is also reminded of its important role in this regard.
The Working Group reminds media of their important role as a public watchdog with special responsibilities for ensuring that factual and reliable information about people of African descent is reported.
The Working Group urges the Government to involve civil society organisations representing people of African descent when framing important legislations concerning them and providing those organizations with adequate funding.
The International Decade on People of African Descent should be officially launched in Belgium at the federal level.
The Working Group also encourages the Government to further implement the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda within Belgium, with focus on indicators relevant for people of African descent, in partnership with civil society. In view of Statbel’s 2018 report on poverty, the Working Group calls on the government to eradicate structural racism to attain the Sustainable Development Goals.
The Working Group would like to reiterate its satisfaction at the Government’s willingness to engage in dialogue, cooperation and action to combat racial discrimination. We hope that our report will support the Government in this process and we express our willingness to assist in this important endeavour.
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"I am really very concerned. I think we are coming to a situation that is similar, to a large extent, to what we lived during the Cold War but with two very important differences," UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres said in response to questions by reporters on the US announcement to expel Russian UN diplomats and could a new Cold War be developing.
Guterres said in the Cold War, there were clearly two superpowers with a complete control of the situation of two areas in the world.
"Now, we have many other actors that are relatively independent and with an important role in many of the conflicts that we are witnessing, with risks of escalation that are well known," he said.

Volgens de 1M van Frankrijk, Edouard Philippe, moet de fusie leiden tot een grotere Europese rail-groep die moet kunnen opboksen tegen de concurrentie van China.
Commentaar: Ik zie niet in hoe een schaalvergroting een voordeel zou kunnen zijn, gegeven de significant lagere productiekosten in China. Het conglomeraat Siemens/Alstom wordt eerder een aantrekkelijker prooi voor de grote appetijt van de Chinese investeerders (of Big Players die zich voor Chinezen laten doorgaan). En dus is het best mogelijk dat Siemans/Alstom binnen enkele jaren opgeslokt wordt door het netwerk van de Big Players.

Hieronder het perspericht van Alstom, vrijgegeven op 26/9/2017.

Siemens and Alstom join forces to create a European Champion in Mobility
26/09/2017
Signed Memorandum of Understanding grants exclusivity to combine mobility businesses in a merger of equals
Listing in France and group headquarters in Paris area; led by Alstom CEO with 50 percent shares of the new entity owned by Siemens
Business headquarter for Mobility Solutions in Germany and for Rolling Stock in France
Comprehensive offering and global presence will offer best value to customers all over the world
Combined company’s revenue €15.3 billion, adjusted EBIT of €1.2 billion
Annual synergies of €470 million expected latest four years after closing
Today, Siemens and Alstom have signed a Memorandum of Understanding to combine Siemens’ mobility business including its rail traction drives business with Alstom. The transaction brings together two innovative players of the railway market with unique customer value and operational potential. The two businesses are largely complementary in terms of activities and geographies. Siemens will receive newly issued shares in the combined company representing 50 percent of Alstom’s share capital on a fully diluted basis.

“This Franco-German merger of equals sends a strong signal in many ways. We put the European idea to work and together with our friends at Alstom, we are creating a new European champion in the rail industry for the long term. This will give our customers around the world a more innovative and more competitive portfolio”, said Joe Kaeser, President and CEO of Siemens AG. “The global market-place has changed significantly over the last few years. A dominant player in Asia has changed global market dynamics and digitalization will impact the future of mobility. Together, we can offer more choices and will be driving this transformation for our customers, employees and shareholders in a responsible and sustainable way”, Kaeser added.

“Today is a key moment in Alstom’s history, confirming its position as the platform for the rail sector consolidation. Mobility is at the heart of today’s world challenges. Future modes of transportation are bound to be clean and competitive. Thanks to its global reach across all continents, its scale, its technological know-how and its unique positioning on digital transportation, the combination of Alstom and Siemens Mobility will bring to its customers and ultimately to all citizens smarter and more efficient systems to meet mobility challenges of cities and countries. By combining Siemens Mobility’s experienced teams, complementary geographies and innovative expertise with ours, the new entity will create value for customers, employees and shareholders,” said Henri Poupart-Lafarge, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Alstom SA. “I am particularly proud to lead the creation of such a group which will undoubtedly shape the future of mobility.”

The new entity will benefit from an order backlog of €61.2 billion, revenue of €15.3 billion, an adjusted EBIT of €1.2 billion and an adjusted EBIT-margin of 8.0 percent, based on information extracted from the last annual financial statements of Alstom and Siemens. In a combined setup, Siemens and Alstom expect to generate annual synergies of €470 million latest in year four post-closing and targets net-cash at closing between €0.5 billion to €1.0 billion. Global headquarters as well as the management team for rolling stock will be located in Paris area and the combined entity will remain listed in France. Headquarters for the Mobility Solutions business will be located in Berlin, Germany. In total, the new entity will have 62,300 employees in over 60 countries.

As part of the combination, Alstom existing shareholders at the close of the day preceding the closing date, will receive two special dividends: a control premium of €4.00 per share (in total = €0.9 billion) to be paid shortly after closing of the transaction and an extraordinary dividend of up to €4.00 per share (in total = €0.9 billion) to be paid out of the proceeds of Alstom’s put options for the General Electric joint ventures of approximately €2.5 billion subject to the cash position of Alstom. Siemens will receive warrants allowing it to acquire Alstom shares representing two percentage points of its share capital that can be exercised earliest four years after closing.

The businesses of the two companies are largely complementary. The combined entity will offer a significantly increased range of diversified product and solution offerings to meet multi-facetted, customer-specific needs, from cost-efficient mass-market platforms to high-end technologies. The global footprint enables the merged company to access growth markets in Middle East and Africa, India, and Middle and South America where Alstom is present, and China, United States and Russia where Siemens is present. Customers will significantly benefit from a well-balanced larger geographic footprint, a comprehensive portfolio offering and significant investment into digital services. The combination of know-how and innovation power of both companies will drive crucial innovations, cost efficiency and faster response, which will allow the combined entity to better address customer needs.

The Board of Directors of the combined group will consist of 11 members and will be comprised of 6 directors designated by Siemens, one of which being the Chairman, 4 independent directors and the CEO. In order to ensure management continuity, Henri Poupart-Lafarge, will continue to lead the company as CEO and will be a board member. Jochen Eickholt, CEO of Siemens Mobility, shall assume an important responsibility in the merged entity. The corporate name of the combined group will be Siemens Alstom.

The envisaged transaction is unanimously supported by Alstom’s board (further to a review process of the preparation of the transaction by the Audit Committee acting as an ad hoc committee) and Siemens’s supervisory board. Bouygues fully supports the transaction and will vote in favor of the transaction at the Alstom’s board of directors and at the extraordinary general meeting deciding on the transaction to be held before July 31, 2018, in line with Alstom board of director decision. The French State also supports the transaction based on undertakings by Siemens, including a standstill at 50.5 percent of Alstom’s share capital for four years after closing and certain governance and organizational and employment protections. The French State confirms that the loan of Alstom shares from Bouygues SA will be terminated in accordance with its terms no later than October 17, 2017 and that it will not exercise the options granted by Bouygues. Bouygues has committed to keep its shares until the earlier of the extraordinary general meeting deciding on the transaction and July 31, 2018.

In France, Alstom and Siemens will initiate Works Councils’ information and consultation procedure according to French law prior to the signing of the transaction documents. If Alstom were not to pursue the transaction, it would have to pay a €140 million break-fee. The transaction will take the form of a contribution in kind of the Siemens Mobility business including its rail traction drives business to Alstom for newly issued shares of Alstom and will be subject to Alstom’s shareholders’ approval, including for purposes of cancelling the double voting rights, anticipated to be held in the second quarter of 2018. The transaction is also subject to clearance from relevant regulatory authorities, including foreign investment clearance in France and anti-trust authorities as well as the confirmation by the French capital market authority (AMF) that no mandatory takeover offer has to be launched by Siemens following completion of the contribution. Closing is expected at the end of calendar year 2018.

de geschiedenis van Siemens

histoire d'Alstom France

Child abuse: Tackling collusion and silence
Abusers must be named, shamed, and punished. Only then will children be a little safer.

One of the worst aspects of the Peter Ball case – as with Jimmy Savile and Cyril Smith – is the collusion and silence of others. The recently published full report of the independent enquiry into the Church’s handling of the Peter Ball case, “An Abuse of Faith”, makes for deeply disturbing reading. Not for the first (or last) time we learn of people in power refusing to act on their suspicions or even to recognise child abuse for what it is: an assault on the dignity and integrity of defenceless minors.

Over the past decades, stories have emerged about the Residential Schools and the Lost Generations in Canada, the Stolen Generations in Australia, and most recently the United Kingdom’s Home Children scheme, under which more than 100,000 girls and boys were forcibly deported to Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa. Many (not all) faced great privation in their new “homes” and in Western Australia and Queensland they faced sexual torment in certain Roman Catholic institutions such as the Christian Brothers.

It is absolutely right that these appalling stories continue to be investigated by journalists and government officials and that documentary and film makers recount them in the best way they can. But there is a danger of complacency. Logic tells us that this is only the tip of the proverbial iceberg and that many more incidents and people must be investigated. A great deal of deeply embedded collusion remains to be uncovered and it is likely that every country has more accounts of neglect, abuse, and denial to be revealed.

Der-kommer-en-dagDenmark is a case in point. Der kommer en dag (The Day Will Come) is a 2016 drama directed by Jesper W. Nielsen. It tells of a school for orphans and “difficult” children where violence and ritual humiliation were part of everyday life. The story is based on a real-life boys’ home called Godhavn, overseen by a sadistic headmaster, a teacher who sexually abused the boys, a doctor who colluded with the headmaster, and a staff who looked the other way.

The Godhavn Inquiry was the first Danish inquiry into child abuse and neglect, the results of which were only made public in May 2011. Financed by the Ministry of Social Affairs, it was an independent investigation of complaints made against Godhavn’s Boys’ Home and 18 other Danish children’s homes. It was one of the first inquiries to investigate the use of psychopharmacological drugs on children. A television documentary triggered the investigation and Der kommer en dag is a dramatization of what happened at one of the boys’ homes.

After the damning Godhavn Report was released, the Danish minister of social affairs refused to offer an apology to the boys, claiming that, according to the legislation of the time and current social policy, nothing illegal had taken place. She stuck to that view even though the Godhavn Report provided clear evidence of physical, psychological, and sexual abuse, as well as failures in state supervision.

It is difficult to discover if anyone responsible for what took place at Godhavn was ever brought to court. What seems to have happened is that the headmaster and other staff were discreetly retired to avoid a criminal investigation. In Britain, Jimmy Savile and Cyril Smith died before their actions were revealed. Disgraced former bishop and convicted paedophile Peter Ball was briefly imprisoned, but others who colluded with him have escaped censure.

In recent years, significant efforts have been made to improve the safeguarding of children. Both the Catholic church in England and Wales and the Church of England have introduced child protection measures. In Rome, Pope Francis set up the Pontifical Commission for the Protection of Minors, although is has been mired in controversy with victims appointed as commissioners resigning their membership.

But as long as there is silence, children will suffer abuse. People must voice their suspicions. Journalists must investigate. The corrupting culture of privilege, power, and make-believe (in high places, the church, education, social services, and the entertainment industry) must be revealed, child abusers identified and called to account. The perpetrators must be named, shamed, and punished. Only that way will children be a little safer.

MSI-MED (2016)09rev2
Recommendation CM/Rec(2017x)xx of the Committee of Ministers to member states on media pluralism and transparency of media ownership
Second revised draft
Preamble

1. Media freedom and pluralism are crucial components of the right to freedom of expression, as guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ETS No. 5, hereinafter “the Convention”). They are central to the functioning of a democratic society as they help to ensure the availability and accessibility of diverse information and views, on the basis of which individuals can form and express their opinions and exchange information and ideas.
2. The media play essential roles in democratic society, by widely disseminating information, ideas, analysis and opinions; acting as public watchdogs, and providing forums for public debate. In the present multi-media ecosystem, these roles continue to be fulfilled by traditional media, but are also increasingly performed by other media and non-media actors, from multinational corporations to non-governmental organisations and individuals.
3. Pluralist democratic societies are made up of a wide range of identities, ideas and interests. It is imperative that this diversity can be communicated through a range of independent and autonomous channels and outlets, thus creating an informed society, contributing to mutual understanding and fostering social cohesion.
4. Different types of media, along with different genres or forms of editorial content or programming contribute to diversity of content. Although content focusing on news and current affairs is of most direct relevance for fostering an informed society, other genres are also very important. Examples include cultural and educational content and entertainment, as well as content aimed at specific sections of society, such as local content.
5. In the present multi-media environment, online media and other internet platforms enable access to a growing range of information from diverse sources. This transformation in how media content is made available and used creates new opportunities for more and more people to interact and communicate with each other and to participate in public debate.
6. This technological evolution also raises concerns for media pluralism. While variety in media sources and types can be instrumental in enhancing diversity of media content and exposure to such diversity, it does not of itself guarantee it. Individuals still have to select what media to use and what content to watch, listen to or read among vast quantities of diverse content distributed across various media. This may result in them selecting or being exposed to information confirming their existing views and opinions, which can, in turn, generate fragmentation and result in a polarised society. While limited news resources and self-imposed restrictions on the choice of content are not new phenomena, the media and internet intermediaries may amplify their inherent risks, through their ability to control the flow, availability, findability and accessibility of information and other content online. This is particularly troubling if the individual users are not aware of these processes or do not understand them.
7. As new actors enter the evolving online market, the ensuing competitive pressures and a shift in advertising revenues towards the internet have contributed to an increase in media consolidation and convergence. Single or a few media owners or groups acquire positions of considerable power where they can separately or jointly set the agenda of public debate and significantly influence or shape public opinion, reproducing the same content across all platforms on which they are present. Convergence trends also lead to cost-cutting, job losses in journalism and media sectors, and the risk of financial dependencies for journalists and the media. These developments may cause a reduction in diversity of news and content generally and ultimately impoverish public debate.
8. Fresh appraisals of existing approaches to media pluralism are called for in order to address the challenges for pluralism resulting from how users and businesses have adapted their behaviour to technological developments. New policy responses and strategic solutions are needed to sustain independent, quality journalism and diverse content across all media types and formats.
9. There is a need for an enhanced role for independent public service media to counteract on-going processes of concentration and convergence in the media. By virtue of their remit, public service media are particularly suited to address the informational needs and interests of all sections of society, as is true of community media in respect of their constituent users. It is of utmost importance for public service media to have within their mandates the responsibility to foster political pluralism and awareness of diverse opinions, notably by providing different groups in society – including cultural, linguistic, ethnic, religious or other minorities – with an opportunity to receive and impart information, to express themselves and to exchange ideas.
10. In light of the increased range of media and content, it is very important for individuals to possess the cognitive, technical and social skills and capacities that enable them to critically analyse media content, and to understand the ethical implications of media and technology. Media literacy contributes to media pluralism and diversity by empowering individuals to effectively access, evaluate and create diverse types of content; by reducing the digital divide; facilitating informed decision-making, especially in respect of political and public affairs and commercial content, and by enabling the identification and countering of false or misleading information and harmful and illegal online content.
11. The adoption and effective implementation of media-ownership regulation plays an important role in respect of media pluralism. Such regulation should ensure transparency in media ownership; it should address issues such as cross-media ownership, direct and indirect media ownership and effective control and influence over the media. It should also ensure that there is effective and manifest separation between the exercise of political authority or influence and control of the media or decision making as regards media content.
12. Transparency of media ownership, organisation and financing help to increase media accountability. Transparency and media literacy are therefore indispensable tools for individuals to make informed decisions about which media they use and how they use them, to search for, access and impart information and ideas of all kinds. This makes them practical instruments of effective pluralism.
13. Against this background, the present Recommendation reaffirms the importance of existing Council of Europe standards dealing with different aspects of media pluralism and transparency of media ownership and the need to fully implement them in democratic societies. The Recommendation builds further on those standards, adjusting, supplementing and reinforcing them, as necessary, to ensure their continued relevance in the current multi-media ecosystem.
Under the terms of Article 15.b of the Statute of the Council of Europe (ETS No. 1), the Committee of Ministers recommends that governments of member States:
i. fully implement the guidelines set out in the appendix to this recommendation;
ii. remain vigilant to, and address, threats to media pluralism and transparency of media ownership by regularly monitoring the state of media pluralism in their national media markets, assessing risks to media freedom and pluralism and adopting appropriate regulatory responses, including by paying systematic attention to such focuses in the on-going reviews of their national laws and practices;
iii. fully implement, if they have not already done so, previous Committee of Ministers’ Recommendations and Declarations dealing with different aspects of media pluralism and transparency of media ownership, in particular those specified in the guidelines appended to the present Recommendation;
iv. promote the goals of this recommendation at the national and international levels and engage and co-operate with all interested parties to achieve those goals.

Appendix to Recommendation

Guidelines

In the context of this Recommendation, unless otherwise specified, the media are generally understood as including print, broadcast and online media.
I. A favourable environment for freedom of expression and media freedom

1. The principles of freedom of expression and media freedom, as grounded in the Convention, must continue to be developed in a way that takes full account of the features of the present multi-media ecosystem, in which a range of new media actors have come to the fore.
2. States have a positive obligation to foster a favourable environment for freedom of expression, in which everyone can exercise their right to freedom of expression and participate in public debate effectively, irrespective of whether or not their views are received favourably by the State or others. States should guarantee free and pluralistic media for their valuable contribution to robust public debate in which societal diversity can be articulated and explored.
3. National legislative and policy frameworks should safeguard the editorial independence and operational autonomy of all media so that they can carry out their key tasks in democratic society. The frameworks should be designed and implemented in such ways as to prevent the State, or any powerful political, economic, religious or other groups from acquiring dominance and exerting pressure on the media.
4. Relevant legislation should ensure that the media have the freedom at all times to provide accurate and reliable reporting on matters of public interest, in particular concerning vital democratic processes and activities, such as elections, referenda and public consultations on matters of general interest. Adequate safeguards should also be put in place to prevent interference with editorial independence of the media in relation to coverage of conflicts, crises and other sensitive situations where quality journalism and reporting are key tools in countering propaganda and disinformation.
5. In a favourable environment for freedom of expression, media regulatory authorities and other authorities or entities entrusted with responsibility for regulating or monitoring other (media) service providers or media pluralism must be able to carry out their remit in an effective, transparent and accountable manner. A prerequisite for them to be able to do so is that they themselves enjoy independence that is guaranteed in law and borne out in practice.
6. The independence of the authorities and entities referred to in the previous paragraph should be guaranteed by ensuring that they: have open and transparent appointment and dismissal procedures; have adequate human and financial resources and autonomous budget allocation; work to transparent procedures and decision-making; have the power to take autonomous decisions and enforce them, and that their decisions are subject to appeal.

7. States should ensure transparency of media ownership, organisation and financing, as well as promote media literacy, in order to provide individuals with the information and critical awareness that they need in order to access diverse information and participate fully in the present multi-media ecosystem.
II. Media pluralism and diversity of media content

General requirements of pluralism
1. As ultimate guarantors of pluralism, States have a positive obligation to put in place an appropriate legislative and policy framework to that end. This implies adopting appropriate measures to ensure sufficient variety in the overall range of media types, bearing in mind differences in terms of their purposes, functions and geographical reach. The complementary nature of different media types strengthens external pluralism and can contribute to creating and maintaining diversity of media content.
2. States are called upon to ensure that there is periodic independent monitoring and evaluation of the state of media pluralism in their jurisdictions based on a set of objective and transparent criteria for identifying risks to the variety in ownership of media sources and outlets, the diversity of media types, the diversity of viewpoints represented by political, ideological, cultural and social groups, and the diversity of interests and viewpoints relevant to local and regional communities. States are further urged to develop and enforce appropriate regulatory and policy responses effectively addressing any risks found.

Specific requirements of pluralism
Diversity of content
3. States should adopt regulatory and policy measures to promote the availability and accessibility of the broadest possible diversity of media content as well as the representation of the whole diversity of society in the media, including by supporting initiatives by media to those ends.

States should encourage the development of open, independent, transparent and participatory initiatives by social media, media stakeholders, civil society and academia, that seek to improve effective exposure of users to the broadest possible diversity of media content online.

Wherever the visibility, findability and accessibility of media content online is influenced by automated processes, whether they are purely automated processes or used in combination with human decisions, States should encourage social media, media stakeholders, civil society and academia to engage in open, independent, transparent and participatory initiatives that:

- increase the transparency of the processes of online distribution of media content, including automated processes;

- assess the impact of such processes on users’ effective exposure to a broad diversity of media content, and

- seek to improve these distribution processes in order to improve users’ exposure to the broadest possible diversity of media content.

4. States should make particular efforts, taking advantage of technological developments, to ensure that the broadest possible diversity of media content, including in different languages, is accessible to all groups in society, particularly those which may have specific needs or face disadvantage or obstacles when accessing media content, such as minority groups, children, the elderly and persons with cognitive or physical disabilities.
5. Diversity of media content can only be properly gauged when there are high levels of transparency about editorial and commercial content: media and other actors should adhere to the highest standards of transparency regarding the provenance of their content and always signal clearly when content is provided by political sources or involves advertising or other forms of commercial communications, such as sponsoring and product placement. This also applies to user-generated content and to hybrid forms of content, including branded content, native advertising and advertorials and infotainment.
Institutional arrangement of media pluralism
6. States should recognise the crucial role of public service media in fostering public debate, political pluralism and awareness of diverse opinions. States should accordingly guarantee adequate conditions for public service media to continue to play this role in the multi-media landscape, including by providing them with appropriate support for innovation and the development of digital strategies and new services.
7. States should adopt appropriate specific measures to protect the editorial independence and operational autonomy of public service media by keeping the influence of the State at arm’s length. The supervisory and management boards of public service media must be able to operate in a fully independent manner and the rules governing their composition and appointment procedures must contain adequate checks and balances to ensure that independence.
8. States should also ensure stable, sustainable, transparent and adequate funding for public service media in order to guarantee their independence from governmental, political and commercial pressures and enable them to provide a broad range of pluralistic information and diverse content. This can also help to counterbalance any risks caused by a situation of media concentration.
9. States should encourage and support the establishment and functioning of community, minority, regional and local media, including by providing financial mechanisms to foster their development. Such independent media give a voice to communities and individuals on topics relevant to their needs and interests, and are thus instrumental in creating public exposure for issues that may not be represented in the mainstream media and in facilitating inclusive and participatory processes of dialogue within and across communities and at regional and local levels.
10. States should facilitate access to cross-border media, which serve communities outside the country where they are established, supplement national media and can help certain groups in society, including immigrants, refugees and diaspora communities, to maintain ties with their countries of origin, native cultures and languages.

Support measures for the media and media pluralism
11. For the purpose of enhancing media pluralism, States should develop strategies and mechanisms to support professional news media and quality journalism, including news production capable of addressing diverse needs and interests of groups that may not be sufficiently represented in the media. They should explore a wide range of measures, including various forms of non-financial and financial support such as advertising and subsidies, which would be available to different media types and platforms, including those of online media. States are also encouraged to support projects relating to journalism education, media research and innovative approaches to strengthen media pluralism and freedom of expression.
12. Support measures should have clearly defined purposes; be based on pre-determined clear, precise, equitable, objective and transparent criteria, and be implemented in full respect of the editorial and operational autonomy of the media. Such measures could include positive measures to enhance the quantity and quality of media coverage of issues that are of interest and relevance to groups which are underrepresented in the media.
13. Support measures should be administered in a non-discriminatory and transparent manner by a body enjoying functional and operational autonomy such as an independent media regulatory authority. An effective monitoring system should also be introduced to supervise such measures, to ensure that they serve the purpose for which they are intended.
III. Regulation of media ownership: ownership, control and concentration

1. In order to guarantee effective pluralism in their jurisdictions, States should adopt and implement a comprehensive regulatory framework for media ownership and control that is adapted to the current state of the media industry. Such a framework should take full account of media convergence and the impact of online media.
Ownership and control
2. Regulation of competition in the media market including merger control should prevent individual actors from acquiring significant market power in the overall national media sector or in a specific media market/sector at the national level or sub-national levels, to the extent that such concentration of ownership limits meaningful choice in the available media content.
3. Media ownership regulation should apply to all media and could include restrictions on horizontal, vertical and cross-media ownership, including by determining thresholds of ownership in line with Recommendation CM/Rec 2007(2) of the Committee of Ministers to member states on media pluralism and diversity of media content. Those thresholds may be based on a number of criteria such as capital shares, voting rights, circulation, revenues, audience share or audience reach.
4. States should set criteria for determining ownership and control of media companies by explicitly addressing direct and beneficial ownership and control. Relevant criteria can include proprietary, financial or voting strength within a media company or companies and the determination of the different levels of strength that lead to exercising control or direct or indirect influence over the strategic decision-making of the company or companies including their editorial policy.
5. As the key democratic tasks of the media include holding authorities to account, legislation should stipulate that the exercise of political authority or influence is incompatible with involvement in the ownership, management or editorial decision-making of the media. The incompatibility of these functions should be recognised as a matter of principle and should not be made conditional on the existence of particular conditions. The criteria of incompatibility and a range of appropriate measures for addressing conflicts of interest should be set out clearly in law.
6. Any restrictions on the extent of foreign ownership of media should apply in a non-discriminatory manner to all such companies and should take full account of the States’ positive obligation to guarantee pluralism and of the relevant guidelines set out in this Recommendation.
Concentration
7. States are also encouraged to develop and apply suitable methodologies for the assessment of media concentration. In addition to measuring the availability of media sources, this assessment should reflect the real influence of individual media by adopting an audience-based approach and using appropriate sets of criteria to measure the use and impact of individual media on opinion-forming.
8. Media ownership regulation should include procedures to prevent media mergers or acquisitions that could adversely affect pluralism of media ownership or diversity of media content. Such procedures could involve a requirement for media owners to notify the relevant independent regulatory authority of any proposed media merger or acquisition whenever the ownership and control thresholds, as set out in legislation, are met.
9. The relevant independent regulatory authority should be vested with powers to assess the expected impact of any proposed concentration on media pluralism and to make recommendations or decisions, as appropriate, about whether the proposed merger or acquisition should be cleared, subject or not to any restrictions or conditions, including divestiture. Decisions of the independent authority should be subject to judicial review.
IV. Transparency of media ownership, organisation and financing

1. States should guarantee a regime of transparency regarding media ownership that ensures the availability of the data necessary for informed regulation and decision-making and enables the public to access those data in order to help them to analyse and evaluate the information, ideas and opinions disseminated by the media.
2. To this end, States should adopt and implement legislation that sets out enforceable disclosure/transparency obligations for media in a clear and precise way. Such obligations should, as a minimum, include the following information:
- Legal name and contact details of a media outlet;
- Name(s) and contact details of the direct owner(s) with shareholdings enabling them to exercise influence on the operation and strategic decision-making of the media outlet. States are recommended to apply a threshold of 5% shareholding for the purpose of the disclosure obligations.
- Identity and contact details of natural persons with beneficial shareholdings. Beneficial shareholding applies to natural persons who ultimately own or control shares in a media outlet or on whose behalf those shares are held, enabling them to indirectly exercise control or significant influence on the operation and strategic decision-making of the media outlet.
- Information on the nature and extent of the share-holdings or voting rights of the above legal and/or natural persons in other media, media-related or advertising companies which could lead to decision-making influence over those companies, or positions held in political parties;
- Name(s) of the persons with actual editorial responsibility or the actual authors of editorial content;
- Changes in ownership and control arrangements of a media outlet.
3. The scope of the above minima for disclosure/transparency obligations for the media includes legal and natural persons based in other jurisdictions and their relevant interests in other jurisdictions.
4. High levels of transparency should also be ensured with regard to the sources of financing of media outlets in order to provide a comprehensive picture of the different sources of potential interference with the editorial and operational independence of the media and allow for effective monitoring and controlling of such risks.
5. To this end, States should adopt and implement legislation that sets out enforceable disclosure of the following information:
- Information on the sources of the media outlet’s income, including from State and other funding mechanisms and (State) advertising.
- The existence of structural relationships or contractual cooperation with other media or advertising companies, political parties or the State, including in respect of State advertising;
6. Legislation should set out clear criteria as to which media are subject to these reporting obligations. The obligations may be limited with regard to factors such as the commercial nature of the media outlet, a wide audience reach, exercise of editorial control, frequency and regularity of publication or broadcast, etc., or a combination thereof. Legislation should also determine the timeframe within which reporting obligations must be met.
7. Such legislation should also require the maintenance of a public, online database of media ownership and control arrangements in the State, with disaggregated data about different types of media (markets/sectors) and regional and/or local levels, as relevant. Those databases should be kept up to date on a rolling basis and they should be available to the public free of charge. They should be accessible and searchable; their contents should be made available in open formats and there should not be restrictions on their re-use.

8. Reporting requirements relating to media ownership should include the provision of:
- A description of media ownership and control arrangements for media under its jurisdiction (including media whose services are directed at other countries);
- A description of changes to the media ownership and control arrangements within the State during the reporting period;
- An analysis of the impact of those changes on media pluralism in the State.
9. Legislation should provide for the publication of reports on media ownership to be accompanied by appropriate explanations of the data and the methodologies used to collect and organise them, in order to help members of the public to interpret the data and understand their significance.
10. States should issue clear, up-to-date guidance on the interrelationship and implications of the different regulatory regimes and on how to implement them correctly and coherently. That guidance could take the form of user-friendly guidelines, handbooks, manuals, etc.
11. States should also facilitate inter-agency cooperation, including the relevant exchange of information about media ownership held by media regulatory authorities, competition authorities and company registers. Similarly, the exchange of information and best practices with other national authorities, both within their own jurisdiction and in other jurisdictions, should be facilitated.
V. Media literacy/education

1. States should introduce legislative provisions or strengthen existing ones that promote media literacy with a view to enabling individuals to access, understand, critically analyse, evaluate, use and create content through a range of legacy and digital (including social) media.
2. States should also develop a national media literacy policy and ensure its operationalisation and implementation through (multi-)annual action plans. A key strategy for that purpose could be to support the creation of a national media literacy network comprising a wide range of stakeholders, or the further development of such a network where it already exists.
3. In the multi-media ecosystem, media literacy is essential for people of all ages and all walks of life. Law and/or policy measures promoting media literacy should thus help to develop the teaching of media literacy in school curricula at all levels and as part of lifelong learning cycles, including by providing suitable training and adequate resources for teachers and educational institutions to develop teaching programmes. Any measures adopted should be developed in consultation with teachers and trainers with a view to ensuring a fair and appropriate integration of relevant activities in work-flows. Any measures adopted should not interfere with the academic autonomy of educational institutions in curricular matters.
4. States should encourage all media, without interfering with their editorial independence, to promote media literacy through policies, strategies and activities. They should also promote media literacy through support schemes for media, taking into account the particular roles of public service media and community media.
5. States should ensure that independent national regulatory authorities have the scope and resources to promote media literacy in ways that are relevant to their mandates and encourage them to do so.
6. States are encouraged to include in their national media literacy programmes focuses on media pluralism and transparency of media ownership in order to help citizens to make an informed and critical evaluation of the information and ideas propagated via the media. To this end, States are called upon to include in their strategies for ensuring transparency in the media sector educational content which enables individuals to use information relating to media ownership, organisation and financing, in order to better understand the different influences on the production, collection, curation and dissemination of media content.

March 29, 2016
Mumbai: The Tata Steel board today reviewed the recent performance of the European business of the company, more specifically, of Tata Steel UK. It noted with deep concern the deteriorating financial performance of the UK subsidiary in the last twelve months. While the global steel demand, especially in developed markets like Europe has remained muted following the financial crisis of 2008, trading conditions in the UK and Europe have rapidly deteriorated more recently, due to structural factors including global oversupply of steel, significant increase in third country exports into Europe, high manufacturing costs, continued weakness in domestic market demand in steel and a volatile currency. These factors are likely to continue into the future and have significantly impacted the long term competitive position of the UK operations in spite of several initiatives undertaken by the management and the workers of the business in recent years. Even under these adverse market conditions, the Tata Steel has extended substantial financial support to the UK business and suffered asset impairment of more than £2 billion in the last five years.



The Tata Steel board also reviewed the proposed restructuring and transformation plan for Strip Products UK, prepared by the European subsidiary in consultation with an independent and internationally reputed consultancy firm. Based on the review conducted, the Tata Steel board came to a unanimous conclusion that the plan is unaffordable, requires material funding support in the next two years in addition to significant capital commitments over the long term, the assumptions behind it are inherently very risky, and its likelihood of delivery is highly uncertain. Therefore, the board concluded that it would not be able to support the investment necessary to proceed with the proposed Strip Products UK transformation plan.

The company has also been in deep engagement with the UK government in recent months seeking its support to achieve the best possible outcome for the UK business, within the restrictions of State Aid Rules and other statutory limits. These discussions are ongoing and will continue. Discussions will also continue with Greybull in relation to a sale of the UK Long Products business. The UK government is also involved in the latter discussions.

Following the strategic view taken by the Tata Steel board regarding the UK business, it has advised the board of its European holding company ie Tata Steel Europe, to explore all options for portfolio restructuring including the potential divestment of Tata Steel UK, in whole or in parts. Given the severity of the funding requirement in the foreseeable future, the Tata Steel Europe board will be advised to evaluate and implement the most feasible option in a time bound manner.

In 2010 kocht de Russische zakenman (en ex-KGB-agent) de krant op.

Who is Martin Wolf?
Martin Wolf is chief economics commentator at the Financial Times, London. He was awarded the CBE (Commander of the British Empire) in 2000 “for services to financial journalism”. Mr Wolf is an honorary fellow of Nuffield College, Oxford, honorary fellow of Corpus Christi College, Oxford University, an honorary fellow of the Oxford Institute for Economic Policy (Oxonia) and an honorary professor at the University of Nottingham.

He has been a forum fellow at the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos since 1999 and a member of its International Media Council since 2006. He was made a Doctor of Letters, honoris causa, by Nottingham University in July 2006. He was made a Doctor of Science (Economics) of London University, honoris causa, by the London School of Economics in December 2006. He was a member of the UK government's Independent Commission on Banking in 2010-2011. Martin's most recent publications are Why Globalization Works and Fixing Global Finance.

Israeli Justice Minister Ayelet Shaked has spoken out in favor of an independent Kurdish state. She also urged increased cooperation between Israel and the Kurdish people. Shaked sees this as an opportunity to weaken Israel’s rivals in the region.
“We must openly call for the establishment of a Kurdish state that separates Iran from Turkey, one which will be friendly towards Israel,” Shaked told the annual INSS security conference in Tel Aviv on Tuesday, as cited by the Times of Israel.
More precisely, Shaked proposed the new state be founded between Turkey, Israel and Iraq.

lees meer over dit plan

Region Chancellor of Security Council Masrour Barzani has issued a message to mark the 2016 New Year, has highlighted the major developments the Middle East and reiterated that Kurds in Iraq should not lose the current opportunity to establish an independent state in the north of Iraq.
In a statement on Thursday, Barzani thanked the people of the Kurdistan Region for remaining strong in the face of a series of crises during the last year, and wished all a peaceful coming year.
All the indications show that political borders in the Middle East will soon be redrawn, reads the statement, and Kurds must not miss this unique opportunity as it may not happen again, BasNews reported.
He reiterated on the role of the Peshmerga forces on the frontlines against Islamic State (IS) and stressed that their sacrifices have created a peaceful atmosphere for people to celebrate the New Year.
“Not only the people of Kurdistan, but the world is now proud of the Peshmerga,” Barzani said.
He urged the international community to provide further immediate support to the Peshmerga forces as “they are fighting on behalf of the globe.”

Europe has to be active in the border protection of Greece and Italy independently of what the Turkish authorities will do.

Maracz verklaarde dit in een interview met RT.

Twee medicijnen met blijkbaar dezelfde werking op oogzieken: een verschil van 760 EUR per injectie.
Het gaat om Lucentis (gelanceerd in 2007, 800 EUR/injectie) van Novartis en Avastin (40 EUR/injectie) van Roche. Testaankoop dient klacht in. Het Federale Geneesmiddelenagentschap (FAGG) houdt zich op de vlakte. In Nederland en Italië wordt Avastin wel gebruikt; Frankrijk volgt.



Tot daar in het kort de berichtgeving van De Standaard.


Discussie al jaren aan de gang
Het is wellicht goed om weten dat de discussie reeds een aantal jaren aan de gang is. Zo wijdde het Nederlandse Pharmaceutisch Weekblad in augustus 2011 reeds een discussie aan dit probleem en liet hoogleraar oogheelkunde prof. dr. Carel Hoyng, werkzaam op de afdeling Oogheelkunde van het UMC St Radboud in Nijmegen, aan het woord. Hyong is ook consulent van Novartis (aldus de gepubliceerde 'Richtlijn Leeftijdgebonden Maculadegeneratie' van 2014, Bijlage 6, Belangenverklaringen). Alhoewel de argumenten in dat artikel van PW genuanceerd naar voor worden gebracht, wordt het toch zonneklaar dat financiële (terugverdienen van de research) en commerciële motieven aan de basis liggen van het prijsverschil en van de achterwege blijvende vraag tot erkenning voor de behandeling van maculadegeneratie (Avastin beschikt overigens over een Europese vergunning, maar dan wel voor andere oncologische aandoeningen) van het goedkopere geneesmiddel Avastin. Zo wordt duidelijk dat een geneesmiddel dan al kan bestaan, maar dat het daarom nog niet op de markt wordt gebracht. Weerom een ethische en geen technische kwestie. Regeert het geldgewin dan overal?
Maar wellicht belangrijker dan het antwoord op deze retorische vraag, is het de mechanismen te doorgronden en de medespelers te herkennen in dit verslindende spel. Daarop kan je namelijk een beleid bouwen - zou een minister dan kunnen denken - zodat middelen overgeheveld naar andere prioritaire velden van de gezondheidszorg zonder te raken aan de medische belangen van maculadegeneratiepatiënten.
Lees het artikel uit het Pharmaceutisch Weekblad hier. Maar voor het geval dat u toch niet doorklikt, hebben we hier een passage die duidelijk maakt dat het over een courante aandoening gaat: "Maculadegeneratie is een ziekte die epidemische vormen aanneemt: op dit moment zijn er in Nederland 100.000 mensen met deze aandoening en jaarlijks komen daar 10.000 bij. Als je een middel hiervoor zo duur maakt, legt dat een te grote belasting op de uitgaven in de zorg." Het gaat dus om een groeimarkt, want in de gezondheidszorg wordt ook in die economische termen nagedacht.

Bij Novartis hebben wij het jaarverslag 2013 opgevraagd. Daaruit blijkt dat Lucentis in 2013 goed was voor een netto-verkoop van 2,383 milliard dollar (tegen 2,398 milliard dollar in 2012 en ca. 1,966 miljard $ in 2011). Dat is exclusief de verkopen van Lucentis in de USA, waar het medicijn door Genentech/Roche op de markt wordt gebracht. Novartis heeft een belang van 33,3% in Roche, goed voor een waarde van 14,8 miljard $ terwijl de totale markwaarde van Roche per 20131231 241,2 miljard $ was. Het jaarverslag benadrukt:'Novartis does not exercise control over Roche Holding AG, which is independently governed, managed en operated.' (AR2013:104) Natuurlijk sluit dit geen commerciële deals op wereldniveau uit.



Wat is het FAGG?

Federaal Agentschap voor Geneesmiddelen en Gezondheidsproducten, FAGG (voorheen Directoraat-generaal Geneesmiddelen van FOD Volksgezondheid)

Oprichtingsdatum: 01.01.2007

Voogdijminister: Maggie De Block (OpenVLD), minister Volksgezondheid [op de website van het FAGG stond tot 20141126 foutief Laurette Onkelinx nog vermeld als voogdijminister - dit is inmiddels bijgesteld]

Administrateur-generaal: Xavier De Cuyper
Instelling van openbaar nut met rechtspersoonlijkheid, ingedeeld in categorie A
Bevoegde overheid op het vlak van de kwaliteit, de veiligheid en de doeltreffendheid van de geneesmiddelen en de gezondheidsproducten
Competentiedomeinen: onderzoek en ontwikkeling (R&D), registratie of vergunning voor het in de handel brengen, productie en distributie (inspectie- en controleactiviteiten), vigilantie, goed gebruik van geneesmiddelen en gezondheidsproducten
Personeel : 390 medewerkers op 01.01.2012 voor het merendeel met een wetenschappelijke vorming (o.a. geneesheren, apothekers, dierenartsen)
Slogan : “Uw geneesmiddelen en gezondheidsproducten, onze zorg”

Bekijk het organogram van het FAGG

Het jaarverslag van het FAGG kunt u hier downloaden








De historiek van Roche vindt u hier

Roche Group Sales 2013: 46,780 milion CHF






Novartis: Kerncijfers 2013: Omzet: 57,9 miljard USD; Netto Resultaat : 9,3 miljard USD

Company History of Novartis

Farmaceutische nota van European Medicines Agency (EMA) over Lucentis ranibizumab

Farmaceutische nota van European Medicines Agency (EMA) over Avastin bevacizumab

Ter info: website van het RIZIV

[tekst aangevuld op 20141202]

(Beirut) – Saudi Arabia’s new terrorism law and a series of related royal decrees create a legal framework that appears to criminalize virtually all dissident thought or expression as terrorism. The sweeping provisions in the measures, all issued since January 2014, threaten to close down altogether Saudi Arabia’s already extremely restricted space for free expression.

“Saudi authorities have never tolerated criticism of their policies, but these recent laws and regulations turn almost any critical expression or independent association into crimes of terrorism,” said Joe Stork, deputy Middle East and North Africa director at Human Rights Watch. “These regulations dash any hope that King Abdullah intends to open a space for peaceful dissent or independent groups.”

The new regulations come amid a campaign to silence independent activists and peaceful dissidents through intimidation, investigations, arrests, prosecutions, and imprisonment. On March 9, the prominent human rights activists Abdullah al-Hamid and Mohammed al-Qahtani completed their first year in prison, serving 11 and 10-year sentences, respectively, for criticizing the government’s human rights abuses and for membership in an unlicensed political and civil rights organization.

Two other human rights activists, Waleed Abu al-Khair and Mikhlif al-Shammari, recently lost appeals and will probably begin their three-month and five-year respective sentences soon for criticizing Saudi authorities.

On January 31, Saudi authorities promulgated the Penal Law for Crimes of Terrorism and its Financing (the “terrorism law”). The law has serious flaws, including vague and overly broad provisions that allow authorities to criminalize free expression, and the creation of excessive police powers without judicial oversight. The law cites violence as an essential element only in reference to attacks carried out against Saudis outside the kingdom or onboard Saudi transportation carriers. Inside the kingdom, “terrorism” can be non-violent – consisting of “any act” intended to, among other things, “insult the reputation of the state,” “harm public order,” or “shake the security of society,” which the law fails to clearly define.

On February 3, two days after the terrorism law came into force, King Abdullah issued Royal Decree 44, which criminalizes “participating in hostilities outside the kingdom” with prison sentences of between three and 20 years. On March 7, the Interior Ministry issued further regulations designating an initial list of groups the government considers terrorist organizations, including the Muslim Brotherhood and the Houthi group in Yemen, along with “Al-Qaeda, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Al-Qaeda in Yemen, Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Da`ish [the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham, or ISIS], Jabhat al-Nusra, and Hezbollah inside the kingdom.”

The interior ministry regulations include other sweeping provisions that authorities can use to criminalize virtually any expression or association critical of the government and its understanding of Islam. These “terrorism” provisions include the following:

Article 1: “Calling for atheist thought in any form, or calling into question the fundamentals of the Islamic religion on which this country is based.”
Article 2: “Anyone who throws away their loyalty to the country’s rulers, or who swears allegiance to any party, organization, current [of thought], group, or individual inside or outside [the kingdom].”
Article 4: “Anyone who aids [“terrorist”] organizations, groups, currents [of thought], associations, or parties, or demonstrates affiliation with them, or sympathy with them, or promotes them, or holds meetings under their umbrella, either inside or outside the kingdom; this includes participation in audio, written, or visual media; social media in its audio, written, or visual forms; internet websites; or circulating their contents in any form, or using slogans of these groups and currents [of thought], or any symbols which point to support or sympathy with them.”
Article 6: “Contact or correspondence with any groups, currents [of thought], or individuals hostile to the kingdom.”
Article 8: “Seeking to shake the social fabric or national cohesion, or calling, participating, promoting, or inciting sit-ins, protests, meetings, or group statements in any form, or anyone who harms the unity or stability of the kingdom by any means.”

Published August 31st 1999 by Routledge

In its first years as an independent state, Azerbaijan was a prime example of post-Soviet chaos - beset by coups and civil strife and astride an ethnic, political and religious divide. Author Goltz was detoured in Baku in mid-1991 and decided to stay, this diary is the record of his experiences.

Thomas Goltz (born October 11, 1954) is an American author and journalist best known for his accounts of conflict in the Caucasus region during the 1990s.

One of the articles in Living With The Land (IC#8)
Originally published in Winter 1984 on page 5
Copyright (c)1985, 1997 by Context Institute
HOWEVER NATURAL “owning” land may seem in our culture, in the long sweep of human existence, it is a fairly recent invention. Where did this notion come from? What does it really mean to “own” land? Why do we, in our culture, allow a person to draw lines in the dirt and then have almost complete control over what goes on inside those boundaries? What are the advantages, the disadvantages, and the alternatives? How might a humane and sustainable culture re-invent the “ownership” connection between people and the land?

These questions are unfamiliar (perhaps even uncomfortable) to much of our society, for our sense of “land ownership” is so deeply embedded in our fundamental cultural assumptions that we never stop to consider its implications or alternatives. Most people are at best only aware of two choices, two patterns, for land ownership – private ownership (which we associate with the industrial West) and state ownership (as in the Communist East).

Both of these patterns are full of problems and paradoxes. Private ownership enhances personal freedom (for those who are owners), but frequently leads to vast concentrations of wealth (even in the U.S., 75% of the privately held land is owned by 5% of the private landholders), and the effective denial of freedom and power to those without great wealth. State ownership muffles differences in wealth and some of the abuses of individualistic ownership, but replaces them with the often worse abuses of bureaucratic control.

Both systems treat the land as an inert resource to be exploited as fully as possible, often with little thought for the future or respect for the needs of non-human life. Both assume that land ownership goes with a kind of exclusive national sovereignty that is intimately connected to the logic of war.

In short, both systems seem to be leading us towards disaster, yet what other options are there?

The answer, fortunately, is that there are a number of promising alternatives. To understand them, however, we will need to begin by diving deeply into what ownership is and where it has come from.

THE HISTORICAL ROOTS

Beginnings Our feelings about ownership have very deep roots. Most animal life has a sense of territory – a place to be at home and to defend. Indeed, this territoriality seems to be associated with the oldest (reptilian) part the brain (see IN CONTEXT, #6) and forms a biological basis for our sense of property. It is closely associated with our sense of security and our instinctual “fight or flight” responses, all of which gives a powerful emotional dimension to our experience of ownership. Yet this biological basis does not determine the form that territoriality takes in different cultures.

Humans, like many of our primate cousins, engage in group (as well as individual) territoriality. Tribal groups saw themselves connected to particular territories – a place that was “theirs.” Yet their attitude towards the land was very different from ours. They frequently spoke of the land as their parent or as a sacred being, on whom they were dependent and to whom they owed loyalty and service. Among the aborigines of Australia, individuals would inherit a special relationship to sacred places, but rather than “ownership,” this relationship was more like being owned by the land. This sense of responsibility extended to ancestors and future generations as well. The Ashanti of Ghana say, “Land belongs to a vast family of whom many are dead, a few are living and a countless host are still unborn.”

For most of these tribal peoples, their sense of “land ownership” involved only the right to use and to exclude people of other tribes (but usually not members of their own). If there were any private rights, these were usually subject to review by the group and would cease if the land was no longer being used. The sale of land was either not even a possibility or not permitted. As for inheritance, every person had use rights simply by membership in the group, so a growing child would not have to wait until some other individual died (or pay a special fee) to gain full access to the land.

Early Agricultural Societies Farming made the human relationship to the land more concentrated. Tilling the land, making permanent settlements, etc., all meant a greater direct investment in a particular place. Yet this did not lead immediately to our present ideas of ownership. As best as is known, early farming communities continued to experience an intimate spiritual connection to the land, and they often held land in common under the control of a village council. This pattern has remained in many peasant communities throughout the world.

It was not so much farming directly, but the larger-than- tribal societies that could be based on farming that led to major changes in attitudes towards the land. Many of the first civilizations were centered around a supposedly godlike king, and it was a natural extension to go from the tribal idea that “the land belongs to the gods” to the idea that all of the kingdom belongs to the god-king. Since the god-king was supposed to personify the whole community, this was still a form of community ownership, but now personalized. Privileges of use and control of various types were distributed to the ruling elite on the basis of custom and politics.

As time went on, land took on a new meaning for these ruling elites. It became an abstraction, a source of power and wealth, a tool for other purposes. The name of the game became conquer, hold, and extract the maximum in tribute. Just as The Parable Of The Tribes (see IN CONTEXT, #7) would suggest, the human-human struggle for power gradually came to be the dominant factor shaping the human relationship to the land. This shift from seeing the land as a sacred mother to merely a commodity required deep changes throughout these cultures such as moving the gods and sacred beings into the sky where they could conveniently be as mobile as the ever changing boundaries of these empires.

The idea of private land ownership developed as a second step – partly in reaction to the power of the sovereign and partly in response to the opportunities of a larger-than- village economy. In the god-king societies, the privileges of the nobility were often easily withdrawn at the whim of the sovereign, and the importance of politics and raw power as the basis of ownership was rarely forgotten. To guard their power, the nobility frequently pushed for greater legal/customary recognition of their land rights. In the less centralized societies and in the occasional democracies and republics of this period, private ownership also developed in response to the breakdown of village cohesiveness. In either case, private property permitted the individual to be a “little king” of his/her own lands, imitating and competing against the claims of the state.

Later Developments By the early days of Greece and Rome, community common land, state or sovereign land, and private land all had strong traditions behind them. Plato and Aristotle both discussed various mixtures of private and state ownership in ideal societies, with Aristotle upholding the value of private ownership as a means of protecting diversity. As history progressed, the “great ownership debate” has continued between the champions of private interests and the champions of the state, with the idea of community common land often praised as an ideal, but in practice being gradually squeezed out of the picture. Feudal Europe was basically a system of sovereign ownership. The rise of commerce and then industrialism shifted power to the private ownership interests of the new middle class (as in the United States). The reaction against the abuses of industrialism during the past 150 years swung some opinion back again, bringing renewed interest in state ownership (as in the Communist countries).

As important as these swings have been historically, they have added essentially nothing to our basic understanding of, or attitudes about, ownership. Throughout the whole history of civilization land has been seen as primarily a source of power, and the whole debate around ownership has been, “To what extent will the state allow the individual to build a personal power base through land ownership rights?”

TAKING A FRESH LOOK

But the human-human power struggle is hardly the only, or even the most important, issue in our relationship to the land. Whatever happened to the tribal concerns about caring for the land and preserving it for future generations? What about issues like justice, human empowerment and economic efficiency? How about the rights of the land itself? If we are to move forward towards a planetary/ecological age, all of these questions and issues are going to need to be integrated into our relationship to the land. To do this we will have to get out beyond the narrow circle of the ideas and arguments of the past.

We have been talking about “ownership” as if it was an obvious, clear-cut concept: either you own (control) something or you don’t. For most people (throughout history) this has been a useful approximation, and it has been the basis of the “great ownership debate.” But if you try to pin it down (as lawyers must), you will soon discover that it is not so simple. As surprising as it may seem, our legal system has developed an understanding of “owning” that is significantly different from our common ideas and has great promise as the basis for a much more appropriate human relationship to the land.

Ownership Is A Bundle Of Rights The first step is to recognize that, rather than being one thing, what we commonly call “ownership” is in fact a whole group of legal rights that can be held by some person with respect to some “property.” In the industrial West, these usually include the right to:

use (or not use);
exclude others from using;
irreversibly change;
sell, give away or bequeath;
rent or lease;
retain all rights not specifically granted to others;
retain these rights without time limit or review.
These rights are usually not absolute, for with them go certain responsibilities, such as paying taxes, being liable for suits brought against the property, and abiding by the laws of the land. If these laws include zoning laws, building codes, and environmental protection laws, you may find that your rights to use and irreversibly change are not as unlimited as you thought. Nevertheless, within a wide range you are the monarch over your property.

No One Owns Land Each of these rights can be modified independent of the others, either by law or by the granting of an easement to some other party, producing a bewildering variety of legal conditions. How much can you modify the above conditions and still call it “ownership”? To understand the answer to this, we are going to have to make a very important distinction. In spite of the way we normally talk, no one ever “owns land”..In our legal system you can only own rights to land, you can’t directly own (that is, have complete claim to) the land itself. You can’t even own all the rights since the state always retains the right of eminent domain. For example, what happens when you sell an easement to the power company so that they can run power lines across you land? They then own the rights granted in that easement, you own most of the other rights, the state owns the right of eminent domain – but no single party owns “the land.” You can carry this as far as you like, dividing the rights up among many “owners,” all of whom will have a claim on some aspect of the land.

The wonderful thing about this distinction is that it shifts the whole debate about land ownership away from the rigid state-vs.-individual, all-or-nothing battle to the much more flexible question of who (including community groups, families, etc. as well as the state and the individual) should have which rights. This shift could be as important as the major improvement in governance that came with the shift from monolithic power (as in a monarchy) to “division of powers” (as exemplified in the U.S. Constitution with its semi-independent legislative, executive and judicial branches).

Legitimate Interests How might the problems associated with exclusive ownership (either private or state) be solved by a “division of rights” approach? To answer this, we need to first consider what are the legitimate interests that need to be included in this new approach. If we are to address all the concerns appropriate for a humane sustainable culture we need to recognize that the immediate user of the land (be that a household or a business), the local community, the planetary community, future generations, and all of life, all have legitimate interests. What are these interests?

The immediate users need the freedom to be personally (or corporately) expressive, creative, and perhaps even eccentric. They need to be able to invest energy and caring into the land with reasonable security that the use of the land will not be arbitrarily taken away and that the full equity value of improvements made to the land will be available to them either through continued use or through resale should they choose to move.
The local community needs optimal use of the land within it, without having land held arbitrarily out of use by absentee landlords. It needs to be able to benefit from the equity increases in the land itself due to the overall development of the community, and it needs security that its character will not be forced to change through inappropriate land use decisions made by those outside the community or those leaving the community.
The planetary community, future generations, and all of life need sustainable use – the assurance that ecosystems and topsoil that have been developed over hundreds of thousands of years will not be casually destroyed; that the opportunities for life will be enhanced; that non-renewal resources will be used efficiently and for long term beneficial purposes. This larger community also needs meaningful recognition that the earth is our common heritage.
Is it possible to blend these various interests in a mutually supportive way, rather than seeing them locked in a power struggle? The answer, fortunately, is yes. Perhaps the best developed alternative legal form that does this is called a land trust.

LAND TRUSTS

A land trust is a non-governmental organization (frequently a non-profit corporation) that divides land rights between immediate users and their community. It is being used in a number of places around the world including India, Israel, Tanzania, and the United States. Of the many types of land trusts, we will focus here on three – conservation trusts, community trusts, and stewardship trusts. These will be discussed in more detail in other articles in this section, but an initial overview now will help to draw together many of the threads we have developed so far.

In a conservation land trust, the purpose is generally to preserve some aspect of the natural environment. A conservation trust may do this by the full ownership of some piece of land that it then holds as wilderness, or it may simply own “development rights” to an undeveloped piece. What are development rights? When the original owner sells or grants development rights to the conservation trust, they put an easement (a legal restriction) on the land that prevents them or any future owners from developing the land without the agreement of the conservation trust. They have let go of the right to “irreversibly change” listed above. The conservation trust then holds these rights with the intention of preventing development. The Trust For Public Land (82 Second St, San Francisco, CA 94105, 415/495-4015) helps community groups establish conservation and agricultural land trusts.

A community land trust (CLT) has as its purpose removing land from the speculative market and making it available to those who will use it for the long term benefit of the community. A CLT generally owns full title to its lands and grants long term (like 99-year) renewable leases to those who will actually use the land. Appropriate uses for the land are determined by the CLT in a process comparable to public planning or zoning. Lease fees vary from one CLT to another, but they are generally more than taxes and insurance, less than typical mortgage payments, and less than full rental cost. The lease holders have many of the use and security rights we normally associate with ownership. They own the buildings on the land and can take full benefit from improvements they make to the land. They can not, however, sell the land nor can they usually rent or lease it without the consent of the trust. The Institute For Community Economics (57 School St. Springfield, MA 01105, 413/746-8660) is one of the major support groups for the creation of community land trusts in both urban and rural settings.

The stewardship trust combines features of both the conservation trust and the CLT, and is being used now primarily by intentional communities and non-profit groups such as schools. The groups using the land (the stewards) generally pay less than in a normal CLT, but there are more definite expectations about the care and use they give to the land.

In each one of these types, the immediate users (nonhuman as well as human) have clear rights which satisfy all of their legitimate use needs. The needs of the local community are met through representation on the board of directors of the trust which can enforce general land use standards. The larger community usually has some representation on the trust’s board as well. Thus by dividing what we normally think of as ownership into “stewardship” (the users) and “trusteeship” (the trust organization), land trusts are pioneering an approach that better meets all the legitimate interests.

The system is, of course, still limited by the integrity and the attitudes of the people involved. Nor are current land trusts necessarily the model for “ownership” in a humane sustainable culture. But they show what can be done and give us a place to build from. I’ll explore more of where we might build to in a later article, but now lets turn to other perspectives and experiences with going beyond ownership.

Bibliography

Chaudhuri, Joyotpaul, Possession, Ownership And Access: A Jeffersonian View (Political Inquiry, Vol 1, No 1, Fall 1973).

Denman, D.R., The Place Of Property (London: Geographical Publications Ltd, 1978).

Institute For Community Economics, The Community Land Trust Handbook (Emmaus, PA: Rodale Press, 1982).

International Independence Institute, The Community Land Trust (Cambridge, MA: Center For Community Economic Development, 1972).

Macpherson, C.B., Property: Mainstream And Critical Positions (Toronto: Univ Of Toronto Press, 1978).

Schlatter, Richard, Private Property: The History Of An Idea (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1951).

Scott, William B., In Pursuit Of Happiness: American Conceptions Of Property (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977).

Tully, James, A Discourse On Property: John Locke And His Adversaries (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ Press, 1980).

Land Rights

by John Talbot

IT WAS NOT so long ago in human history that the rights of all humans were not acknowledged, even in the democracies. Slavery was only abolished a few generations ago. In the same way that we have come to see human rights as being inherent, so we are now beginning to recognize land rights, and by land I mean all life that lives and takes its nourishment from it, as well as the soil and earth itself. Once we have understood and accepted that idea, we can truly enter into a cooperative relationship with Nature. I’m not talking about living in fear of disturbing anything or a totally “hands off nature” angry ecologist view, but simply acknowledging the right to be of land and nature, and that when we do “disturb” it we do so with sensitivity and respect, doing our best to be in harmony with what is already there.

Being in harmony, apart from being a very subjective state, may not always be possible: for example in the case of putting a house down where once there wasn’t one. But we as humans have needs too. Nature knows that and is, I believe, quite willing to accommodate us. Our responsibility is, however, to act consciously and with the attitude of respect and desire for cooperation. It is no different from respecting other people’s rights in our interactions, being courteous and sensitive to their needs and feelings. This attitude toward the land is almost universally held by aboriginal and native peoples, from the Bushman to the Native American Indians to the tribes of the South Pacific. Earth Etiquette, you might say.

Following directly from that is the principle that you cannot really buy, sell or own the land. Just as we cannot (or should not) own slaves of our own species, we would not make slaves of animals, plants or the land and nature in general. Sounds easy but I feel this represents a very profound and fundamental change in human attitudes; one that takes thought, effort and time to reprogram in ourselves.

Aldo Moro





by

Michelle Wehling





Aldo Moro was an influential figure in Italy both in his life and in his death. He was a law professor, an Italian Statesman, and leader of the Christian Democratic Party who served as premier of Italy five times. In the following pages I will take a brief look at the life and the death of Aldo Moro.



Aldo Moro was born September 23, 1916, in Maglie in the southeastern region of Puglia and was active in Italian politics until his death May 9, 1978. He graduated from the University of Bari in 1940 and after graduating he also taught there. As a professor of law at Bari he published several books dealing with legal issues and served as the president of the Federation of Italian University Catholics and the Movement of Catholic Graduates.



After World war II Aldo Moro was elected to the Constituent Assembly in 1946 and helped draft Italy's new constitution. He was elected to the Chamber of Deputies in 1948 and was head of the Christian Democrats in the chamber between 1953-1955. After the collapse of the fascist regime in 1943 he helped organize the Christian Democratic Party in Puglia. He then held several cabinet posts including under secretary of foreign affairs, minister of justice, and minister of public instruction.



He took the position of secretary of the Christian Democrats in 1959 at the time when a crisis threatened to split the party. As leader of the party he favored a coalition with the Socialists and helped bring about the resignation of conservative Christian Democrat prime minister Fernando Tambroni in July, 1960.



In 1963 he was invited to form his own government and he assembled a cabinet including some socialists. He resigned after being defeated on a budget issue on June 26, 1964, but on July 22, 1964 he formed a new cabinet much like the old one and after Amoitore Fanfani's resignation in 1965 moro temporarily became his own prime minister and renewed his pledge to Nato and the United Nations.



Italy's years of inflation and failing industrial growth prevented Moro from initiating many of the reforms he envisioned which angered the Socialists who effected his defeat in January 1966. In February he formed a new government and after the general elections in 1968 he resigned as was customary.



He became foreign minister from 1970-1972. In November of 1974 he became premier with a coalition government, but the government fell on January 7, 1976. Moro was again premier from February12 through April 30 and remained in office as head of a caretaker government until July 9, 1976.



In October 1976 he became president of the Christian Democrats and remained a powerful influence even though he held no public office. Although Moro was opposed to a formal role for the Communists in the government he was instrumental in bringing about the arrangement in 1976 by which Communists were given an unofficial voice in government and important parliamentary posts in return for agreeing not to vote against the Christian Democratic party in Parliament. Later he was instrumental in overcoming the Christian Democratic resistance to continued cooperation with the Communists.



Moro was generally regarded as the next president of Italy, however, on March 16, 1978, Aldo Moro was kidnapped in Rome by Red Brigades terrorists while on his way to a special session of Parliament. After officials repeatedly refused to release thirteen members of the Red Brigades on trial in Turin, Moro was murdered in or near Rome on May 9, 1978.



As influential as Aldo Moro was in his lifetime , his death and the cover up that followed has also been influential. At this point I would like to take a look at what has come to be known as the Moro Affair. I will begin with a chronology of the fifty four days from his kidnapping to his execution. March 16, 1978, Aldo Moro president of the Christian Democratic Party, the ruling party in Italy, is kidnapped in Rome and his five bodyguards are murdered. The Red Brigades then announce that Moro is in their hands. Parliament empowers Giulio Andreotti backed by a new majority, a five party coalition, which includes the Communists for the first time in Italian history. The communists immediately adopt an intransigent position against the communist Red Brigades and prevent negotiations. March 17, Andreotti meets with the party chiefs of the new majority and they agree on stern measures against political terrorism. March 18, the Red Brigades issue their first message that Moro is being held prisoner and is to be tried as a political prisoner and they release a photo of him. March 19, One of the cars used for the kidnapping is found. March 20, the states trial of Red Brigades chief Renato Curcio, and fourteen others resumes in Turin after a series of delays imposed by the terrorist actions. March 21, the Andreotti government increases police power extending the most massive manhunt throughout Italy . The press, which has been urged by the government to use caution, debates the wisdom of self censorship. The U.S. house of representatives unanimously votes to support the Andreotti government. March 24 , in Turin the Red Brigades attack Giovanni Picco, a Christian Democrat and former mayor of Turin. March 25, the second message is sent from the terrorists stating that his interrogation is under way by a people's tribunal and a list of the charges against Moro is included. March 29, three confidential letters written by Moro are delivered by the Red Brigades in an attempt to set up a two way secret hot line. The Red Brigades make public, along with the message three, the letter Moro wrote to Interior Minister Cossiga in which Moro spoke of a prisoner exchange to be made by the Vatican. March 30, Andreotti assumes a no negotiation stance and the press portray Moro as a man under tortured mind altering drugs. March 31, the Vatican announces its availability as a mediator but backs down when this creates difficulties.



April 1, It is rumored that Nicola Rana, Moro's secretary, has received a letter. The next day his family is also said to have received a letter. April 2, Pope Paul VI appealing publicly for Moro's life begins to develop a position independent of and in contrast to that of the Vatican. April 3, the police carry out house to house searches and arrests among members of the extreme left, but within forty eight hours nearly all are released. April 4, message four is delivered with a letter from Moro to the Christian Democratic party citing evidence that Moro's position on prisoner exchanges predates his capture and cannot be considered as forced on him by the Red Brigades.



April 5, Il Giorno publishes a letter from Elenora Moro to the editor in the hope that the Red Brigades would show it to her husband. April 6, Moro writes a letter to his family asking for a situation report. April 7, the family replies by writing another letter in the Il Giorno.



April 8, Moro writes back outlining his war plans. The message is intercepted by the police, but is kept secret both by the family and government. April 10, message five arrives containing a handwritten note from Moro attacking his ex-interior minister. April 11, the Red Brigades assassinate a Turin prison guard branded as torturer. April 12, it is said that Cossiga, Rana and family have received more letters. April 14, Jimmy Carter sends Andreotti personal letter with full backing. April 15, message six proclaims Moro's guilt and the people's tribunal sentences him to death. April 17, the U.S. State Department reaffirms complete support of Rome's stance. Amnesty International appeals to Red Brigades seeking to discuss Moro's release. April 18, unathenticated message seven announces Moro's execution. April 19, the family disregards message seven in petition to open negotiations signed by internationally renowned personalities and church figures. April 20, the Red Brigades assassinate the head of the Milan prison guards. Verified message seven released with photo of Moro reading of his death. The Christian Democrats are given a forty eight hour ultimatum to indicate willingness to negotiate prisoner exchange. April 21, Moro writes a letter urging the party to break their hard line stance. April 22, the ultimatum expires at 3 p.m..



April 24, message eight containing a list of thirteen communist prisoners in exchange for Moro. April 25, Secretary General Waldheim goes over the heads of the Italian Government and speaks to the Red Brigades by satellite television. April 26, Christian Democratic Rome leader is kneecapped. Il Giorno publishes letter from family assuring Moro of support. April 27, FIAT executive kneecapped by Red Brigades. April 28, Andreotti reaffirms hard line stance. April 29, Moro writes several letters to key persons in power in a final attempt to bring about a grass roots revolution of his party. April 30, the family breaks with Christian Democratic leadership charging them with obstructing initiatives to release Moro.



May 1, the Socialists meet with Red Brigades convinced that their plan for one on one exchange will provide for Moro's release. May 2, the Socialists meet with the Christian Democrats to gain support. May 3, Andreotti repudiates the one for one proposal. May 5, message nine arrives announcing the executing sentence along with a letter to Moro's wife. April 6, the family joins the Socialists to bring all pressure to bear on the Chief of State. May 7, Fanfani is forced to speak out publicly hoping to signal Red Brigades that new moves are on the way. May 8 , Fanfani himself attempts to signal but holds back his main thrust for private talks with Andreotti the next morning. The family is reassured by Leone that he will sign pardon, but he buckles under Andreotti. May 9, while Fanfani argues the case against a hard line stance, news arrives that Moro has been found dead in a car in a street midway between the headquarters of the Christian Democrats and t

boven Noord-Rhodesië.

Over de mogelijkheid van een aanslag, lees:

CIA and MI5 linked to Hammarskjöld death

by MARLENE BURGER

Capetown: Documents the Truth Commission stumbled across linking South African agents to the airline death of UN chief Dag Hammarskjöld, also reveal that the project was hatched at the highest levels of the CIA and MI5.

The alleged plot to assassinate United Nations secretary general Dag Hammarskjöld 37 years ago was the brainchild of at least two British security agencies — MI5 and the Special Operations Executive — and the CIA, top-secret documents show.

For once, apartheid's dirty tricks brigade appears to have been falsely accused of involvement in the murder.

A series of messages between a commodore and a captain, whose names have been expunged by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, point to a plot hatched on South African soil by a group which had access to vast amounts of money and the ability to muster mercenary forces to protect international investment in turbulent post-colonial Africa.

The messages, all on letterheads of the South Africa Institute for Maritime Research (SAIMR), cover the period from July 1960 to September 17 1961 — the day on which Hammarskjöld's aircraft crashed while approaching the airport at Ndola in the then Northern Rhodesia.

In addition to outlining Operation Celeste — the plan to get rid of the "troublesome" Hammarskjöld — the documents implicate the SAIMR and international intelligence agencies in the death of Patrice Lumumba, the pro-communist first president of the Congo. Lumumba was deposed in September 1960 and allegedly shot while escaping from custody in the breakaway province of Katanga in 1961.

The documents, found by a truth commission researcher investigating an apparently unrelated matter, implicate then CIA chief Allen Dulles in Operation Celeste. They also claim that the explosives used for the bomb that downed the aircraft were supplied by a Belgian mining conglomerate, Union Miniere. The company had extensive interests in copper-rich Katanga, and is known to have backed to Tshombe's use of mercenaries, including the group led by South Africa's Colonel "Mad Mike" Hoare.

The most damning report refers to a meeting between MI5, Special Operations Executive, the CIA and the SAIMR at which it was recorded that Dulles "agrees ... Dag is becoming troublesome and ... should be removed". According to the documents, Dulles "has promised full co-operation from his people ... Dag will be in Leopoldville on or about 12/9/61. The aircraft ferrying him will be a DC6 in the livery of [Swedish company] Transair."

The captain is ordered to "see that Leo airport [Leopoldville, now Kinshasa] as well as Elizabethville [now Lubumbashi] is covered by your people, as I want his removal to be handled more efficiently than was Patrice [Lumumba]".

The first message is dated July 12 1960, less than two weeks after the Congo became independent: “Head office is rather concerned with developments in the Congo, particularly the Haute Katanga, where it appears the local strongman Moise Tshombe, supported by Union Miniere, is planning a secession." The writer claims to "have it on good authority that the UNO [United Nations Organisation] will want to get its greedy paws on the province. He says he has been instructed to ask the captain "to send as many agents as you think would be needed to bolster Congo Red's unit in case of future problems".

Civil war broke out in the Congo four days after independence, and Tshombe announced Katanga's secession on July 11. The commodore records this in his next message, sent on July 15, the day UN troops arrived at Lumumba's request.

The next orders inform the captain: "Your contact with CIA is Dwight. He will be residing at Hotel Leopold II in Elizabethville from now until November 1 1961. The password is: ‘How is Celeste these days?' His response should be: 'She's recovering nicely apart from the cough.'"

Hammarskjöld's death appears to have been part of an attempt to prevent Katanga's mineral wealth from falling under communist control.

On September 14 1961, a message couriered to the SAIMR's offices in De Villiers Street, Johannesburg, recorded: "DC6 aircraft bearing Transair livery is parked at Leo to be used for transport of subject. Our technician has orders to plant 6lb TNT in the wheelbay with contact detonator to activate as wheels are retracted on taking off."

An earlier message records that "Union Miniere has offered to provide logistic or other support. We have told them to have 6lb of TNT at all possible locations with detonators, electrical contacts and wiring, batteries, etc."

A report dated September 17 records: "Device failed on take-off, and the aircraft crashed a few hours later as it prepared to land." An official inquiry blamed pilot error.

The documents have been dismissed as fakes by a former Swedish diplomat, and both MI5 and the CIA have denied any involvement in Hammarskjöld's death. However, they bear a striking resemblance to other documents emanating from the SAIMR seven years ago, when it was headed by self-styled commodore Keith Maxwell-Annandale and forged links with both South Africa's military intelligence and the National Intelligence Services. These documents show the SAIMR masterminded the abortive 1981 attempt to depose Seychelles president Albert René. It was also behind a successful 1990 coup in Somalia.

Source : Electronic Mail&Guardian, August 28, 1998. http://www.mg.co.za/mg/news/

http://southmovement.alphalink.com.au/southnews/980829-truth.html

zie ook SPAAK 1969: 246

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The venue in 1955

The building in 2007; now it is a museum of the conference
The first large-scale Asian–African or Afro–Asian Conference—also known as the Bandung Conference (Indonesian: Konferensi Asia-Afrika)—was a meeting of Asian and African states, most of which were newly independent, which took place on 18-24 April 1955 in Bandung, Indonesia. The twenty-nine countries that participated at the Bandung Conference represented nearly one-quarter of the Earth's land surface and a total population of 1.5 billion people, roughly 54% of the Earth's population at the time.[1][2] The conference was organised by Indonesia, Burma (Myanmar), Pakistan, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), and India and was coordinated by Ruslan Abdulgani, secretary general of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The conference's stated aims were to promote Afro-Asian economic and cultural cooperation and to oppose colonialism or neocolonialism by any nation. The conference was an important step toward the Non-Aligned Movement.

In 2005, on the 50th anniversary of the original conference, leaders from Asian and African countries met in Jakarta and Bandung to launch the New Asian-African Strategic Partnership (NAASP). They pledged to promote political, economic, and cultural cooperation between the two continents.


Contents
1 Background
2 Discussion
3 Participants
4 Declaration
5 United States involvement
6 Outcome and legacy
6.1 Asian-African Summit of 2005
6.2 Other anniversaries
7 See also
8 References
8.1 Bibliography
9 Further reading
10 External links
Background
The conference of Bandung was preceded by the Bogor Conference (1949). The Bogor Conference was the seed for the Colombo Plan and Bandung Conference. The 2nd Bogor Conference was held 28-29 December 1954.[3]

The Bandung Conference reflected what the organisers regarded as a reluctance by the Western powers to consult with them on decisions affecting Asia in a setting of Cold War tensions; their concern over tension between the People's Republic of China and the United States; their desire to lay firmer foundations for China's peace relations with themselves and the West; their opposition to colonialism, especially French influence in North Africa and its colonial rule in Algeria; and Indonesia's desire to promote its case in the dispute with the Netherlands over western New Guinea (Irian Barat).

Sukarno, the first president of the Republic of Indonesia, portrayed himself as the leader of this group of states, which he later described as "NEFOS" (Newly Emerging Forces).[4] His daughter, Megawati Sukarnoputri headed the PDI-P party during both summit anniversaries, and the President of Indonesia Joko Widodo during the 3rd summit was a member of her party.

On 4 December 1954 the United Nations announced that Indonesia had successfully gotten the issue of West New Guinea placed on the agenda of the 1955 General Assembly,[5] plans for the Bandung conference were announced in December 1954.[6]

Discussion

Plenary hall of the conference building
Major debate centered around the question of whether Soviet policies in Eastern Europe and Central Asia should be censured along with Western colonialism. A memo was submitted by 'The Moslem Nations under Soviet Imperialism', accusing the Soviet authorities of massacres and mass deportations in Muslim regions, but it was never debated.[7] A consensus was reached in which "colonialism in all of its manifestations" was condemned, implicitly censuring the Soviet Union, as well as the West.[8] China played an important role in the conference and strengthened its relations with other Asian nations. Having survived an assassination attempt on the way to the conference, the Chinese premier, Zhou Enlai, displayed a moderate and conciliatory attitude that tended to quiet fears of some anticommunist delegates concerning China's intentions.

Later in the conference, Zhou Enlai signed on to the article in the concluding declaration stating that overseas Chinese owed primary loyalty to their home nation, rather than to China – a highly sensitive issue for both his Indonesian hosts and for several other participating countries. Zhou also signed an agreement on dual nationality with Indonesian foreign minister Sunario.

Participants

Countries represented in the Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955. Twenty-nine independent countries were present, representing over half the world's population. Vietnam is represented twice by both North Vietnam and the State of Vietnam, which became South Vietnam.

Member states of the Non-Aligned Movement (2012). Light blue states have observer status.
Afghanistan Kingdom of Afghanistan
Burma
Cambodia Kingdom of Cambodia
Dominion of Ceylon
People's Republic of China
Cyprus1
Egypt Republic of Egypt
Ethiopian Empire
Gold Coast
India
Indonesia
Iran Iran
Kingdom of Iraq
Japan
Jordan
Laos Kingdom of Laos
Lebanon
Liberia
Libya Kingdom of Libya
Nepal Kingdom of Nepal
Dominion of Pakistan
Philippines
Saudi Arabia
Syria Syrian Republic
Sudan Republic of the Sudan
Thailand
Turkey
South Vietnam State of Vietnam
Democratic Republic of Vietnam
Yemen Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen
1 A pre-independent colonial Cyprus was represented by [the] eventual first president, Makarios III.[9]

Some nations were given "observer status". Such was the case of Brazil, who sent Ambassador Bezerra de Menezes.

Declaration
A 10-point "declaration on promotion of world peace and cooperation," incorporating the principles of the United Nations Charter was adopted unanimously:

Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and principles of the charter of the United Nations
Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations
Recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations large and small
Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country
Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself, singly or collectively, in conformity with the charter of the United Nations
(a) Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve any particular interests of the big powers
(b) Abstention by any country from exerting pressures on other countries
Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country
Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of the parties own choice, in conformity with the charter of the United Nations
Promotion of mutual interests and cooperation
Respect for justice and international obligations.[10]
The final Communique of the Conference underscored the need for developing countries to loosen their economic dependence on the leading industrialised nations by providing technical assistance to one another through the exchange of experts and technical assistance for developmental projects, as well as the exchange of technological know-how and the establishment of regional training and research institutes.

United States involvement
For the US, the Conference accentuated a central dilemma of its Cold War policy: by currying favor with Third World nations by claiming opposition to colonialism, it risked alienating its colonialist European allies.[11] The US security establishment also feared that the Conference would expand China's regional power.[12] In January 1955 the US formed a "Working Group on the Afro-Asian Conference" which included the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), the Office of Intelligence Research (OIR), the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the United States Information Agency (USIA).[13] The OIR and USIA followed a course of "Image Management" for the US, using overt and covert propaganda to portray the US as friendly and to warn participants of the Communist menace.[14]

The United States, at the urging of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, shunned the conference and was not officially represented. However, the administration issued a series of statements during the lead-up to the Conference. These suggested that the US would provide economic aid, and attempted to reframe the issue of colonialism as a threat by China and the Eastern Bloc.[15]

Representative Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. (D-N.Y.) attended the conference, sponsored by Ebony and Jet magazines instead of the U.S. government.[15] Powell spoke at some length in favor of American foreign policy there which assisted the United States's standing with the Non-Aligned. When Powell returned to the United States, he urged President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Congress to oppose colonialism and pay attention to the priorities of emerging Third World nations.[16]

African American author Richard Wright attended the conference with funding from the Congress for Cultural Freedom. Wright spent about three weeks in Indonesia, devoting a week to attending the conference and the rest of his time to interacting with Indonesian artists and intellectuals in preparation to write several articles and a book on his trip to Indonesia and attendance at the conference. Wright's essays on the trip appeared in several Congress for Cultural Freedom magazines, and his book on the trip was published as The Color Curtain: A Report on the Bandung Conference. Several of the artists and intellectuals with whom Wright interacted (including Mochtar Lubis, Asrul Sani, Sitor Situmorang, and Beb Vuyk) continued discussing Wright's visit after he left Indonesia.[17][18]

Outcome and legacy
The conference was followed by the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference in Cairo[19] in September (1957) and the Belgrade Conference (1961), which led to the establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement.[20] In later years, conflicts between the nonaligned nations eroded the solidarity expressed at Bandung.

Asian-African Summit of 2005
To mark the 50th anniversary of The Summit, Heads of State and Government of Asian-African countries attended a new Asian-African Summit from 20–24 April 2005 in Bandung and Jakarta. Some sessions of the new conference took place in Gedung Merdeka (Independence Building), the venue of the original conference. Of the 106 nations invited to the historic summit, 89 were represented by their heads of state or government or ministers.[3] The Summit was attended by 54 Asian and 52 African countries.

The 2005 Asian African Summit yielded, inter-alia, the Declaration of the New Asian–African Strategic Partnership (NAASP),[21] the Joint Ministerial Statement on the NAASP Plan of Action, and the Joint Asian African Leaders’ Statement on Tsunami, Earthquake and other Natural Disasters. The conclusion of aforementioned declaration of NAASP is the Nawasila (nine principles) supporting political, economic, and socio-cultural cooperation.

The Summit concluded a follow-up mechanism for institutionalization process in the form of Summit concurrent with Business Summit every four years, Ministerial Meeting every two years, and Sectoral Ministerial as well as Technical Meeting if deemed necessary.

Other anniversaries
On the 60th anniversary of the Asian-African Conference and the 10th anniversary of the NAASP, a 3rd summit was held in Bandung and Jakarta from 21–25 April 2015, with the theme Strengthening South-South Cooperation to Promote World Peace and Prosperity. Delegates from 109 Asian and African countries, 16 observer countries and 25 international organizations participated.[3]

See also
Asian–African Legal Consultative Organization
Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence
Sino-Indonesian Dual Nationality Treaty
Third World
References
geographer, Matt Rosenberg Matt Rosenberg is a professional; book, writer with over 20 years of experience He is the author of both a geography reference; contests, a guide to winning National Geography Bee. "Current World Population and Future Projections". ThoughtCo. Retrieved 10 February 2019.
Bandung Conference of 1955 and the resurgence of Asia and Africa Archived 13 May 2012 at the Wayback Machine, Daily News, Sri Lanka
"Asian-African Conference timeline". The Jakarta Post. Retrieved 8 September 2017.
Cowie, H.R. (1993). Australia and Asia. A changing Relationship, 18.
United Nations General Assembly, Report of the First Committee A/2831
Parker, "Small Victory, Missed Chance" (2006), p. 156.
Schindler, Colin (2012). Israel and the European Left. New York: Continuum. p. 205. ISBN 978-1441150134.
"Bandung Conference - Asia-Africa [1955]". Encyclopedia Britannica. Retrieved 10 February 2019.
Cyprus and the Non–Aligned Movement Archived 2016-03-03 at the Wayback Machine, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (April, 2008)
Jayaprakash, N D (June 5, 2005). "India and the Bandung Conference of 1955 – II". People's Democracy – Weekly Organ of the Communist Party of India (Marxist). XXIX (23). Archived from the original on 11 March 2007. Retrieved 2007-02-07.
Parker, "Small Victory, Missed Chance" (2006), p. 154. "... Bandung presented Washington with a geopolitical quandary. Holding the Cold War line against communism depended on the crumbling European empires. Yet U.S. support for that ancien régime was sure to earn the resentment of Third World nationalists fighting against colonial rule. The Eastern Bloc, facing no such guilt by association, thus did not face the choice Bandung presented to the United States: side with the rising Third World tide, or side with the shaky imperial structures damming it in."
Parker, "Small Victory, Missed Chance" (2006), p. 155.
Parker, "Small Victory, Missed Chance" (2006), pp. 157–158.
Parker, "Small Victory, Missed Chance" (2006), p. 161. "An OCB memorandum of March 28 [...] recounts the efforts by OIR and the working group to distribute intelligence 'on Communist intentions, and [on] suggestions for countering Communist designs.' These were sent to U.S. posts overseas, with instructions to confer with invitee governments, and to brief friendly attendees. Among the latter, 'efforts will be made to exploit [the Bangkok message] through the Thai, Pakistani, and Philippine delegations.' Posts in Japan and Turkey would seek to do likewise. On the media front, the administration briefed members of the American press; '[this] appear[s] to have been instrumental in setting the public tone.' Arrangements had also been made for USIA coverage. In addition, the document refers to budding Anglo-American collaboration in the 'Image Management' effort surrounding Bandung."
Parker, "Small Victory, Missed Chance" (2006), p. 162.
"Adam Clayton Powell Jr". United States House of Representatives. Retrieved February 1, 2015.
Roberts, Brian Russell (2013). Artistic Ambassadors: Literary and International Representation of the New Negro Era. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press. pp. 146–172. ISBN 0813933684.
Roberts, Brian Russell; Foulcher, Keith (2016). Indonesian Notebook: A Sourcebook on Richard Wright and the Bandung Conference. Durham: Duke University Press. ISBN 0822360667.
Mancall, Mark. 1984. China at the Center. p. 427
Nazli Choucri, "The Nonalignment of Afro-Asian States: Policy, Perception, and Behaviour", Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, Vol. 2, No. 1.(Mar., 1969), pp. 1-17.
"Seniors official meeting" (PDF). MFA of Indonesia. Retrieved 2012-10-01.
Bibliography
Parker, Jason C. "Small Victory, Missed Chance: The Eisenhower Administration, the Bandung Conference, and the Turning of the Cold War." In The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War. Ed. Kathryn C. Statler & Andrew L. Johns. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006. ISBN 0742553817
Further reading
Asia-Africa Speaks From Bandung. Jakarta: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, 1955.
Ampiah, Kweku. The Political and Moral Imperatives of the Bandung Conference of 1955 : the Reactions of the US, UK and Japan. Folkestone, UK : Global Oriental, 2007. ISBN 1-905246-40-4
Brown, Colin. 2012. "The Bandung Conference and Indonesian Foreign Policy", Ch 9 in Anne Booth, Chris Manning and Thee Kian Wie, 2012, Essays in Honour of Joan Hardjono, Jakarta: Yayasan Pustaka Obor Indonesia.
Dinkel, Jürgen, The Non-Aligned Movement. Genesis, Organization and Politics (1927-1992), New Perspectives on the Cold War 5, Brill: Leiden/Boston 2019. ISBN:978-90-04-33613-1
Kahin, George McTurnan. The Asian-African Conference: Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1956.
Lee, Christopher J., ed, Making a World After Empire: The Bandung Moment and Its Political Afterlives. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2010. ISBN 978-0896802773
Mackie, Jamie. Bandung 1955: Non-Alignment and Afro-Asian Solidarity. Singapore: Editions Didier Millet, 2005. ISBN 981-4155-49-7
Finnane, Antonia, and Derek McDougall, eds, Bandung 1955: Little Histories. Melbourne: Monash Asia Institute, 2010. ISBN 978-1-876924-73-7
External links
Modern History Sourcebook: Prime Minister Nehru: Speech to Asian-African Conference Political Committee, 1955
Modern History Sourcebook: President Sukarno of Indonesia: Speech at the Opening of the Asian-African Conference, 18 April 1955
"Asian-African Conference: Communiqué; Excerpts" (PDF). Egyptian presidency website. 24 April 1955. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2011-04-23. Retrieved 23 April 2011.

De oliebelangen zijn particuliere belangen.

The London Declaration was a declaration issued by the 1949 Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference on the issue of India's continued membership in the Commonwealth of Nations after its transition to a republican constitution. It was made in London on 28 April 1949 and marked the birth of the modern Commonwealth. The declaration had two main provisions: It allowed the Commonwealth to admit and retain members that were not Dominions, so including both republics and indigenous monarchies, and it changed the name of the organisation from the British Commonwealth to the Commonwealth of Nations, reflecting the first change. The Declaration recognised King George VI as Head of the Commonwealth. Following his death, the Commonwealth leaders recognised Queen Elizabeth II in that capacity.

The London Declaration
The Governments of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New
Zealand, South Africa, India, Pakistan and Ceylon, whose countries are
united as Members of the British Commonwealth of Nations and owe a
common allegiance to the Crown, which is also the symbol of their free
association, have considered the impending constitutional changes in
India.
The Government of India have informed the other Governments of the
Commonwealth of the intention of the Indian people that under the new
constitution which is about to be adopted India shall become a sovereign
independent republic. The Government of India have however declared
and affirmed India’s desire to continue her full membership of the
Commonwealth of Nations and her acceptance of The King as the symbol
of the free association of its independent member nations and as such the
Head of the Commonwealth.
The Governments of the other countries of the Commonwealth, the basis
of whose membership of the Commonwealth is not hereby changed,
accept and recognise India’s continuing membership in accordance with
the terms of this declaration.
Accordingly the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand,
South Africa, India, Pakistan and Ceylon hereby declare that they remain
united as free and equal members of the Commonwealth of Nations,
freely co-operating in the pursuit of peace, liberty and progress.
26 April 1949

Noot LT: te checken onder welke omstandigheden

In 930 Althingi (Parliament) was established at Thingvellir. Its formation inaugurated the Icelandic Commonwealth, a form of republic which lasted until 1262, when Iceland came under the rule of the Norwegian crown. In 1383, both Norway and Iceland came under the Danish crown. After the collapse of the Icelandic Commonwealth, conditions in Iceland gradually deteriorated due to harsher climate, natural disasters and disruptions in trade. Christianity was adopted in Iceland at Althingi in the year 1000. The Reformation was imposed by the Danish king and Catholicism effectively came to an end in 1550. All church property reverted to the king, who greatly increased his power and in 1602 imposed a Danish trade monopoly. In 1662, absolute monarchy was established, and by the end of the 18th century Althingi had been dissolved. In the 19th century, conditions began to improve and the political movement for greater autonomy grew stronger. In 1874 Iceland received its own constitution and control of its finances. In 1904 Iceland won home rule and in 1918 it became independent, although the king of Denmark remained as sovereign. The Republic of Iceland was formally proclaimed at Thingvellir on 17 June, 1944. (bron: www.iceland.org/be)

Les nouveaux états en Afrique ont été formés très rarement par le libre consentement des indigènes. (p. V).

Schweinfurt racontait qu'en 1874 les marchands arabes de Bar-el-Gazhal avaient un stock d'environ 50 à 60.000 esclaves. (p. 105)

L'État exige des chefs qu'ils inculpent à leurs lioiiinies les notions d'une morale supérieure et lui inspirent notamment le respect de la personne et de la liberté d'autrui.
Défense a été faite aux soldats, comme d'ailleurs à tous les serviteurs noirs de Etat, de disposer, pour leur service personnel, de femmes et d'enfants indigènes : il y avait là une habitude qui entretenait et développait chez
les noirs des idées d'esclavage qu'il importait de déraciner. Ces dispositions appliquées rigoureusement ont produit des résultats appréciables. Les soldats, formés à une école d'ordre et de moralité, s'assimilent des principes de discipline, de vie régulière et de bonnes mœuis dont, de retour dans leurs villages, ils sont les propagateurs. La polygamie a pu être partout extirpée par les conscriptionnaires, sauf dans la Province Orientale où l'état social des Arabes a laissé des racines profondes et où l'introduction de mœurs nouvelles rencontre de réelles difficultés. Le Gouvernement entend toutefois que la polygamie soit interdite là comme ailleurs parmi le personnel noir de l'Etat et rend responsables les chefs civils et militaires des faits répréhensibles (ju'ils toléreraient en cette matière. (p. 296)

Les rébellions qui se sont produites ont éclaté exclusivement parmi ces soldats originaires de la Province Orientale, appartenant à des peuplades guerrières, formées par les Arabes à une vie de rapines et de violences.
C'est lors de l'expédition vers le nord, commandée par le Vice Gouverneur baron Dhanis, qu'est née la première mutinerie. La force armée de cette expédition était précisément composée presque entièrement de ces éléments, les circonstances n'ayant pas permis de la former au moyen de soldats d'origines différentes coinme le prescrivent les instructions.
La campagne contre les révoltés dure depuis trois ans. Elle a été commencée le 15 février 1896. Cette longue durée s'explique par l'extrême mobilité des révoltés qui battus sur un point, se débandent et vont se reformer sur un autre. La poursuite, dans une contrée qui n'est presque tout entière qu'une forêt vierge, est extrêmement difficile, parfois impossible. Actuellement les révoltés paraissent manquer de cartouches et sont, pense-t-on, dorénavant hors d'état de constituer un danger. Les opérations seront continuées contre eux jusqu'à ce qu'ils soient complètement subjugués. (p. 298)

Here the searchable PDF-file (SPDF):

UNITED STATES PUBLIC LAW 103-150



103d Congress Joint Resolution 19

Nov. 23, 1993

To acknowledge the 100th anniversary of the January 17, 1893 overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii, and to offer an apology to Native Hawaiians on behalf of the United States for the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii.



Whereas, prior to the arrival of the first Europeans in 1778, the Native Hawaiian people lived in a highly organized, self-sufficient, subsistent social system based on communal land tenure with a sophisticated language, culture, and religion;



Whereas, a unified monarchical government of the Hawaiian Islands was established in 1810 under Kamehameha I, the first King of Hawaii;



Whereas, from 1826 until 1893, the United States recognized the independence of the Kingdom of Hawaii, extended full and complete diplomatic recognition to the Hawaiian Government, and entered into treaties and conventions with the Hawaiian monarchs to govern commerce and navigation in 1826, 1842, 1849, 1875, and 1887;



Whereas, the Congregational Church (now known as the United Church of Christ), through its American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, sponsored and sent more than 100 missionaries to the Kingdom of Hawaii between 1820 and 1850;



Whereas, on January 14, 1893, John L. Stevens (hereafter referred to in this Resolution as the "United States Minister"), the United States Minister assigned to the sovereign and independent Kingdom of Hawaii conspired with a small group of non-Hawaiian residents of the Kingdom of Hawaii, including citizens of the United States, to overthrow the indigenous and lawful Government of Hawaii;



Whereas, in pursuance of the conspiracy to overthrow the Government of Hawaii, the United States Minister and the naval representatives of the United States caused armed naval forces of the United States to invade the sovereign Hawaiian nation on January 16, 1893, and to position themselves near the Hawaiian Government buildings and the Iolani Palace to intimidate Queen Liliuokalani and her Government;



Whereas, on the afternoon of January 17,1893, a Committee of Safety that represented the American and European sugar planters, descendants of missionaries, and financiers deposed the Hawaiian monarchy and proclaimed the establishment of a Provisional Government;



Whereas, the United States Minister thereupon extended diplomatic recognition to the Provisional Government that was formed by the conspirators without the consent of the Native Hawaiian people or the lawful Government of Hawaii and in violation of treaties between the two nations and of international law;



Whereas, soon thereafter, when informed of the risk of bloodshed with resistance, Queen Liliuokalani issued the following statement yielding her authority to the United States Government rather than to the Provisional Government:





"I Liliuokalani, by the Grace of God and under the Constitution of the Hawaiian Kingdom, Queen, do hereby solemnly protest against any and all acts done against myself and the Constitutional Government of the Hawaiian Kingdom by certain persons claiming to have established a Provisional Government of and for this Kingdom.

"That I yield to the superior force of the United States of America whose Minister Plenipotentiary, His Excellency John L. Stevens, has caused United States troops to be landed a Honolulu and declared that he would support the Provisional Government.



"Now to avoid any collision of armed forces, and perhaps the loss of life, I do this under protest and impelled by said force yield my authority until such time as the Government of the United States shall, upon facts being presented to it, undo the action of its representatives and reinstate me in the authority which I claim as the Constitutional Sovereign of the Hawaiian Islands.".



Done at Honolulu this 17th day of January, A.D. 1893.;



Whereas, without the active support and intervention by the United States diplomatic and military representatives, the insurrection against the Government of Queen Liliuokalani would have failed for lack of popular support and insufficient arms;



Whereas, on February 1, 1893, the United States Minister raised the American flag and proclaimed Hawaii to be a protectorate of the United States;



Whereas, the report of a Presidentially established investigation conducted by former Congressman James Blount into the events surrounding the insurrection and overthrow of January 17, 1893, concluded that the United States diplomatic and military representatives had abused their authority and were responsible for the change in government;



Whereas, as a result of this investigation, the United States Minister to Hawaii was recalled from his diplomatic post and the military commander of the United States armed forces stationed in Hawaii was disciplined and forced to resign his commission;



Whereas, in a message to Congress on December 18, 1893, President Grover Cleveland reported fully and accurately on the illegal acts of the conspirators, described such acts as an "act of war, committed with the participation of a diplomatic representative of the United States and without authority of Congress", and acknowledged that by such acts the government of a peaceful and friendly people was overthrown;



Whereas, President Cleveland further concluded that a "substantial wrong has thus been done which a due regard for our national character as well as the rights of the injured people requires we should endeavor to repair" and called for the restoration of the Hawaiian monarchy;



Whereas, the Provisional Government protested President Cleveland's call for the restoration of the monarchy and continued to hold state power and pursue annexation to the United States;



Whereas, the Provisional Government successfully lobbied the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate (hereafter referred to in this Resolution as the "Committee") to conduct a new investigation into the events surrounding the overthrow of the monarchy;



Whereas, the Committee and its chairman, Senator John Morgan, conducted hearings in Washington, D.C., from December 27,1893, through February 26, 1894, in which members of the Provisional Government justified and condoned the actions of the United States Minister and recommended annexation of Hawaii;



Whereas, although the Provisional Government was able to obscure the role of the United States in the illegal overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy, it was unable to rally the support from two-thirds of the Senate needed to ratify a treaty of annexation;



Whereas, on July 4, 1894, the Provisional Government declared itself to be the Republic of Hawaii;



Whereas, on January 24, 1895, while imprisoned in Iolani Palace, Queen Liliuokalani was forced by representatives of the Republic of Hawaii to officially abdicate her throne;



Whereas, in the 1896 United States Presidential election, William McKinley replaced Grover Cleveland;



Whereas, on July 7, 1898, as a consequence of the Spanish-American War, President McKinley signed the Newlands Joint Resolution that provided for the annexation of Hawaii;



Whereas, through the Newlands Resolution, the self-declared Republic of Hawaii ceded sovereignty over the Hawaiian Islands to the United States;



Whereas, the Republic of Hawaii also ceded 1,800,000 acres of crown, government and public lands of the Kingdom of Hawaii, without the consent of or compensation to the Native Hawaiian people of Hawaii or their sovereign government;



Whereas, the Congress, through the Newlands Resolution, ratified the cession, annexed Hawaii as part of the United States, and vested title to the lands in Hawaii in the United States;



Whereas, the Newlands Resolution also specified that treaties existing between Hawaii and foreign nations were to immediately cease and be replaced by United States treaties with such nations;



Whereas, the Newlands Resolution effected the transaction between the Republic of Hawaii and the United States Government;



Whereas, the indigenous Hawaiian people never directly relinquished their claims to their inherent sovereignty as a people or over their national lands to the United States, either through their monarchy or through a plebiscite or referendum;



Whereas, on April 30, 1900, President McKinley signed the Organic Act that provided a government for the territory of Hawaii and defined the political structure and powers of the newly established Territorial Government and its relationship to the United States;



Whereas, on August 21,1959, Hawaii became the 50th State of the United States;



Whereas, the health and well-being of the Native Hawaiian people is intrinsically tied to their deep feelings and attachment to the land;



Whereas, the long-range economic and social changes in Hawaii over the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries have been devastating to the population and to the health and well-being of the Hawaiian people;



Whereas, the Native Hawaiian people are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territory, and their cultural identity in accordance with their own spiritual and traditional beliefs, customs, practices, language, and social institutions;



Whereas, in order to promote racial harmony and cultural understanding, the Legislature of the State of Hawaii has determined that the year 1993, should serve Hawaii as a year of special reflection on the rights and dignities of the Native Hawaiians in the Hawaiian and the American societies;



Whereas, the Eighteenth General Synod of the United Church of Christ in recognition of the denomination's historical complicity in the illegal overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii in 1893 directed the Office of the President of the United Church of Christ to offer a public apology to the Native Hawaiian people and to initiate the process of reconciliation between the

Signed by the representatives of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, the United States of America, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, Sweden-Norway, and Turkey (Ottoman Empire).

(Printable version of this text)

GENERAL ACT OF THE CONFERENCE AT BERLIN OF THE PLENIPOTENTIARIES OF GREAT BRITAIN, AUSTRIA-HUNGARY, BELGIUM, DENMARK, FRANCE, GERMANY, ITALY, THE NETHERLANDS, PORTUGAL, RUSSIA, SPAIN, SWEDEN AND NORWAY, TURKEY AND THE UNITED STATES RESPECTING: (1) FREEDOM OF TRADE IN THE BASIN OF THE CONGO; (2) THE SLAVE TRADE; (3) NEUTRALITY OF THE TERRITORIES IN THE BASIN OF THE CONGO; (4) NAVIGATION OF THE CONGO; (5) NAVIGATION OF THE NIGER; AND (6) RULES FOR FUTURE OCCUPATION ON THE COAST OF THE AFRICAN CONTINENT

In the Name of God Almighty.

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India; His Majesty the German Emperor, King of Prussia; His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Bohemia, etc, and Apostolic King of Hungary; His Majesty the King of the Belgians; His Majesty the King of Denmark; His Majesty the King of Spain; the President of the United States of America; the President of the French Republic; His Majesty the King of Italy; His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand Duke of Luxemburg, etc; His Majesty the King of Portugal and the Algarves, etc; His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias; His Majesty the King of Sweden and Norway, etc; and His Majesty the Emperor of the Ottomans,

WISHING, in a spirit of good and mutual accord, to regulate the conditions most favourable to the development of trade and civilization in certain regions of Africa, and to assure to all nations the advantages of free navigation on the two chief rivers of Africa flowing into the Atlantic Ocean;

BEING DESIROUS, on the other hand, to obviate the misunderstanding and disputes which might in future arise from new acts of occupation (prises de possession) on the coast of Africa; and concerned, at the same time, as to the means of furthering the moral and material well-being of the native populations;

HAVE RESOLVED, on the invitation addressed to them by the Imperial Government of Germany, in agreement with the Government of the French Republic, to meet for those purposes in Conference at Berlin, and have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries, to wit:

[Names of plenipotentiaries included here.]

Who, being provided with full powers, which have been found in good and due form, have successively discussed and adopted:

1. A Declaration relative to freedom of trade in the basin of the Congo, its embouchures and circumjacent regions, with other provisions connected therewith.

2. A Declaration relative to the slave trade, and the operations by sea or land which furnish slaves to that trade.

3. A Declaration relative to the neutrality of the territories comprised in the Conventional basin of the Congo.

4. An Act of Navigation for the Congo, which, while having regard to local circumstances, extends to this river, its affluents, and the waters in its system (eaux qui leur sont assimilées), the general principles enunciated in Articles 58 and 66 of the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna, and intended to regulate, as between the Signatory Powers of that Act, the free navigation of the waterways separating or traversing several States - these said principles having since then been applied by agreement to certain rivers of Europe and America, but especially to the Danube, with the modifications stipulated by the Treaties of Paris (1856), of Berlin (1878), and of London (1871 and 1883).

5. An Act of Navigation for the Niger, which, while likewise having regard to local circumstances, extends to this river and its affluents the same principles as set forth in Articles 58 and 66 of the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna.

6. A Declaration introducing into international relations certain uniform rules with reference to future occupations on the coast of the African Continent.

And deeming it expedient that all these several documents should be combined in one single instrument, they (the Signatory Powers) have collected them into one General Act, composed of the following Articles:

CHAPTER I

DECLARATION RELATIVE TO FREEDOM OF TRADE IN THE BASIN OF THE CONGO, ITS MOUTHS AND CIRCUMJACENT REGIONS, WITH OTHER PROVISIONS CONNECTED THEREWITH

Article 1

The trade of all nations shall enjoy complete freedom-

1. In all the regions forming the basin of the Congo and its outlets. This basin is bounded by the watersheds (or mountain ridges) of the adjacent basins, namely, in particular, those of the Niari, the Ogowé, the Schari, and the Nile, on the north; by the eastern watershed line of the affluents of Lake Tanganyika on the east; and by the watersheds of the basins of the Zambesi and the Logé on the south. It therefore comprises all the regions watered by the Congo and its affluents, including Lake Tanganyika, with its eastern tributaries.

2. In the maritime zone extending along the Atlantic Ocean from the parallel situated in 2º30' of south latitude to the mouth of the Logé.

The northern boundary will follow the parallel situated in 2º30' from the coast to the point where it meets the geographical basin of the Congo, avoiding the basin of the Ogowé, to which the provisions of the present Act do not apply.

The southern boundary will follow the course of the Logé to its source, and thence pass eastwards till it joins the geographical basin of the Congo.

3. In the zone stretching eastwards from the Congo Basin, as above defined, to the Indian Ocean from 5 degrees of north latitude to the mouth of the Zambesi in the south, from which point the line of demarcation will ascend the Zambesi to 5 miles above its confluence with the Shiré, and then follow the watershed between the affluents of Lake Nyassa and those of the Zambesi, till at last it reaches the watershed between the waters of the Zambesi and the Congo.

It is expressly recognized that in extending the principle of free trade to this eastern zone the Conference Powers only undertake engagements for themselves, and that in the territories belonging to an independent Sovereign State this principle shall only be applicable in so far as it is approved by such State. But the Powers agree to use their good offices with the Governments established on the African shore of the Indian Ocean for the purpose of obtaining such approval, and in any case of securing the most favourable conditions to the transit (traffic) of all nations.

Article 2

All flags, without distinction of nationality, shall have free access to the whole of the coastline of the territories above enumerated, to the rivers there running into the sea, to all the waters of the Congo and its affluents, including the lakes, and to all the ports situate on the banks of these waters, as well as to all canals which may in future be constructed with intent to unite the watercourses or lakes within the entire area of the territories described in Article 1. Those trading under such flags may engage in all sorts of transport, and carry on the coasting trade by sea and river, as well as boat traffic, on the same footing as if they were subjects.

Article 3

Wares, of whatever origin, imported into these regions, under whatsoever flag, by sea or river, or overland, shall be subject to no other taxes than such as may be levied as fair compensation for expenditure in the interests of trade, and which for this reason must be equally borne by the subjects themselves and by foreigners of all nationalities. All differential dues on vessels, as well as on merchandise, are forbidden.

Article 4

Merchandise imported into these regions shall remain free from import and transit dues.

The Powers reserve to themselves to determine after the lapse of twenty years whether this freedom of import shall be retained or not.

Article 5

No Power which exercises or shall exercise sovereign rights in the abovementioned regions shall be allowed to grant therein a monopoly or favour of any kind in matters of trade.

Foreigners, without distinction, shall enjoy protection of their persons and property, as well as the right of acquiring and transferring movable and immovable possessions; and national rights and treatment in the exercise of their professions.

PROVISIONS RELATIVE TO PROTECTION OF THE NATIVES, OF MISSIONARIES AND TRAVELLERS, AS WELL AS RELATIVE TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY

Article 6

All the Powers exercising sovereign rights or influence in the aforesaid territories bind themselves to watch over the preservation of the native tribes, and to care for the improvement of the conditions of their moral and material well-being, and to help in suppressing slavery, and especially the slave trade. They shall, without distinction of creed or nation, protect and favour all religious, scientific or charitable institutions and undertakings created and organized for the above ends, or which aim at instructing the natives and bringing home to them the blessings of civilization.

Christian missionaries, scientists and explorers, with their followers, property and collections, shall likewise be the objects of especial protection.

Freedom of conscience and religious toleration are expressly guaranteed to the natives, no less than to subjects and to foreigners. The free and public exercise of all forms of divine worship, and the right to build edifices for religious purposes, and to organize religious missions belonging to all creeds, shall not be limited or fettered in any way whatsoever.

POSTAL REGIME

Article 7

The Convention of the Universal Postal Union, as revised at Paris 1 June 1878, shall be applied to the Conventional basin of the Congo.

The Powers who therein do or shall exercise rights of sovereignty or Protectorate engage, as soon as circumstances permit them, to take the measures necessary for the carrying out of the preceding provision.

RIGHT OF SURVEILLANCE VESTED IN THE INTERNATIONAL NAVIGATION COMMISSION OF THE CONGO

Article 8

In all parts of the territory had in view by the present Declaration, where no Power shall exercise rights of sovereignty or Protectorate, the International Navigation Commission of the Congo, instituted in virtue of Article 17, shall be charged with supervising the application of the principles proclaimed and perpetuated (consacrés) by this Declaration.

In all cases of difference arising relative to the application of the principles established by the present Declaration, the Governments concerned may agree to appeal to the good offices of the International Commission, by submitting to it an examination of the facts which shall have occasioned these differences.

CHAPTER II

DECLARATION RELATIVE TO THE SLAVE TRADE

Article 9

Seeing that trading in slaves is forbidden in conformity with the principles of international law as recognized by the Signatory Powers, and seeing also that the operations, which, by sea or land, furnish slaves to trade, ought likewise to be regarded as forbidden, the Powers which do or shall exercise sovereign rights or influence in the territories forming the Conventional basin of the Congo declare that these territories may not serve as a market or means of transit for the trade in slaves, of whatever race they may be. Each of the Powers binds itself to employ all the means at its disposal for putting an end to this trade and for punishing those who engage in it.

CHAPTER III

DECLARATION RELATIVE TO THE NEUTRALITY OF THE TERRITORIES COMPRISED IN THE CONVENTIONAL BASIN OF THE CONGO

Article 10

In order to give a new guarantee of security to trade and industry, and to encourage, by the maintenance of peace, the development of civilization in the countries mentioned in Article 1, and placed under the free trade system, the High Signatory Parties to the present Act, and those who shall hereafter adopt it, bind themselves to respect the neutrality of the territories, or portions of territories, belonging to the said countries, comprising therein the territorial waters, so long as the Powers which exercise or shall exercise the rights of sovereignty or Protectorate over those territories, using their option of proclaiming themselves neutral, shall fulfil the duties which neutrality requires.

Article 11

In case a Power exercising rights of sovereignty or Protectorate in the countries mentioned in Article 1, and placed under the free trade system, shall be involved in a war, then the High Signatory Parties to the present Act, and those who shall hereafter adopt it, bind themselves to lend their good offices in order that the territories belonging to this Power and comprised in the Conventional free trade zone shall, by the common consent of this Power and of the other belligerent or belligerents, be placed during the war under the rule of neutrality, and considered as belonging to a non-belligerent State, the belligerents thenceforth abstaining from extending hostilities to the territories thus neutralized, and from using them as a base for warlike operations.

Article 12

In case a serious disagreement originating on the subject of, or in the limits of, the territories mentioned in Article 1, and placed under the free trade system, shall arise between any Signatory Powers of the present Act, or the Powers which may become parties to it, these Powers bind themselves, before appealing to arms, to have recourse to the mediation of one or more of the friendly Powers.

In a similar case the same Powers reserve to themselves the option of having recourse to arbitration.

CHAPTER IV

ACT OF NAVIGATION FOR THE CONGO

Article 13

The navigation of the Congo, without excepting any of its branches or outlets, is, and shall remain, free for the merchant ships of all nations equally, whether carrying cargo or ballast, for the transport of goods or passengers. It shall be regulated by the provisions of this Act of Navigation, and by the rules to be made in pursuance thereof.

In the exercise of this navigation the subjects and flags of all nations shall in all respects be treated on a footing of perfect equality, not only for the direct navigation from the open sea to the inland ports of the Congo, and vice versa, but also for the great and small coasting trade, and for boat traffic on the course of the river.

Consequently, on all the course and mouths of the Congo there will be no distinction made between the subjects of riverain States and those of non-riverain States, and no exclusive privilege of navigation will be conceded to companies, corporations or private persons whatsoever.

These provisions are recognized by the Signatory Powers as becoming henceforth a part of international law.

Article 14

The navigation of the Congo shall not be subject to any restriction or obligation which is not expressly stipulated by the present Act. It shall not be exposed to any landing dues, to any station or depot tax, or to any charge for breaking bulk, or for compulsory entry into port.

In all the extent of the Congo the ships and goods in process of transit on the river shall be submitted to no transit dues, whatever their starting place or destination.

There shall be levied no maritime or river toll based on the mere fact of navigation, nor any tax on goods aboard of ships. There shall only be levied taxes or duties having the character of an equivalent for services rendered to navigation itself, to wit:

1. Harbour dues on certain local establishments, such as wharves, warehouses, etc, if actually used.

The tariff of such dues shall be framed according to the cost of constructing and maintaining the said local establishments; and it will be applied without regard to whence vessels come or what they are loaded with.

2. Pilot dues for those stretches of the river where it may be necessary to establish properly qualified pilots.

The tariff of these dues shall be fixed and calculated in proportion to the service rendered.

3. Charges raised to cover technical and administrative expenses incurred in the general interest of navigation, including lighthouse, beacon and buoy duties.

The lastmentioned dues shall be based on the tonnage of vessels as shown by the ship's papers, and in accordance with the rules adopted on the Lower Danube.

The tariffs by which the various dues and taxes enumerated in the three preceding paragraphs shall be levied shall not involve any differential treatment, and shall be officially published at each port.

The Powers reserve to themselves to consider, after the lapse of five years, whether it may be necessary to revise, by common accord, the abovementioned tariffs.

Article 15

The affluents of the Congo shall in all respects be subject to the same rules as the river of which they are tributaries.

And the same rules shall apply to the streams and river as well as the lakes and canals in the territories defined in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 1.

At the same time the powers of the International Commission of the Congo will not extend to the said rivers, streams, lakes and canals, unless with the assent of the States under whose sovereignty they are placed. It is well understood, also, that with regard to the territories mentioned in paragraph 3 of Article 1 the consent of the Sovereign States owning these territories is reserved.

Article 16

The roads, railways or lateral canals which may be constructed with the special object of obviating the innavigability or correcting the imperfection of the river route on certain sections of the course of the Congo, its affluents, and other waterways placed under a similar system, as laid down in Article 15, shall be considered in their quality of means of communication as dependencies of this river, and as equally open to the traffic of all nations.

And, as on the river itself, so there shall be collected on these roads, railways and canals only tolls calculated on the cost of construction, maintenance and management, and on the profits due to the promoters.

As regards the tariff of these tolls, strangers and the natives of the respective territories shall be treated on a footing of perfect equality.

Article 17

There is instituted an International Commission, charged with the execution of the provisions of the present Act of Navigation.

The Signatory Powers of this Act, as well as those who may subsequently adhere to it, may always be represented on the said Commission, each by one delegate. But no delegate shall have more than one vote at his disposal, even in the case of his representing several Governments.

This delegate will be directly paid by his Government. As for the various agents and employees of the International Commission, their remuneration shall be charged to the amount of the dues collected in conformity with paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 14.

The particulars of the said remuneration, as well as the number, grade and powers of the agents and employees, shall be entered in the returns to be sent yearly to the Governments represented on the International Commission.

Article 18

The members of the International Commission, as well as its appointed agents, are invested with the privilege of inviolability in the exercise of their functions. The same guarantee shall apply to the offices and archives of the Commission.

Article 19

The International Commission for the Navigation of the Congo shall be constituted as soon as five of the Signatory Powers of the present General Act shall have appointed their delegates. And, pending the constitution of the Commission, the nomination of these delegates shall be notified to the Imperial Government of Germany, which will see to it that the necessary steps are taken to summon the meeting of the Commission.

The Commission will at once draw up navigation, river police, pilot and quarantine rules.

These rules, as well as the tariffs to be framed by the Commission, shall, before coming into force, be submitted for approval to the Powers represented on the Commission. The Powers interested will have to communicate their views with as little delay as possible.

Any infringement of these rules will be checked by the agents of the International Commission wherever it exercises direct authority, and elsewhere by the riverain Power.

In the case of an abuse of power, or of an act of injustice, on the part of any agent or employee of the International Commission, the individual who considers himself to be aggrieved in his person or rights may apply to the consular agent of his country. The latter will examine his complaint, and if he finds it prima facie reasonable he will then be entitled to bring it before the Commission. At his instance then, the Commission, represented by at least three of its members, shall, in conjunction with him, inquire into the conduct of its agent or employee. Should the consular agent look upon the decision of the Commission as raising questions of law (objections de droit), he will report on the subject to his Government, which may then have recourse to the Powers represented on the Commission, and invite them to agree as to the instructions to be given to the Commission.

Article 20

The International Commission of the Congo, charged in terms of Article 17 with the execution of the present Act of Navigation, shall in particular have power-

1. To decide what works are necessary to assure the navigability of the Congo in accordance with the needs of international trade.

On those sections of the river where no Power exercises sovereign rights the International Commission will itself take the necessary measures for assuring the navigability of the river.

On those sections of the river held by a Sovereign Power the International Commission will concert its action (s'entendra) with the riparian authorities.

2. To fix the pilot tariff and that of the general navigation dues as provided for by paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 14.

The tariffs mentioned in the first paragraph of Article 14 shall be framed by the territorial authorities within the limits prescribed in the said Article.

The levying of the various dues shall be seen to by the international or territorial authorities on whose behalf they are established.

3. To administer the revenue arising from the application of the preceding paragraph (2).

4. To superintend the quarantine establishment created in virtue of Article 24.

5. To appoint officials for the general service of navigation, and also its own proper employees.

It will be for the territorial authorities to appoint sub-inspectors on sections of the river occupied by a Power, and for the International Commission to do so on the other sections.

The riverain Power will notify to the International Commission the appointment of sub-inspectors, and this Power will undertake the payment of their salaries.

In the exercise of its functions, as above defined and limited, the International Commission will be independent of the territorial authorities.

Article 21

In the accomplishment of its task the International Commission may, if need be, have recourse to the war vessels of the Signatory Powers of this Act, and of those who may in future accede to it, under reserve, however, of the instructions which may be given to the commanders of these vessels by their respective Governments.

Article 22

The war vessels of the Signatory Powers of this Act that may enter the Congo are exempt from payment of the navigation dues provided for in paragraph 3 of Article 14; but, unless their intervention has been called for by the International Commission or its agents, in terms of the preceding Article, they shall be liable to the payment of the pilot or harbour dues which may eventually be established.

Article 23

With the view of providing for the technical and administrative expenses which it may incur, the International Commission created by Article 17 may, in its own name, negotiate loans to be exclusively guaranteed by the revenues raised by the said Commission.

The decisions of the Commission dealing with the conclusion of a loan must be come to by a majority of two-thirds. It is understood that the Governments represented on the Commission shall not in any case be held as assuming any guarantee, or as contracting any engagement or joint liability (solidarité) with respect to the said loans, unless under special Conventions concluded by them to this effect.

The revenue yielded by the dues specified in paragraph 3 of Article 14 shall bear, as a first charge, the payment of the interest and sinking fund of the said loans, according to agreement with the lenders.

Article 24

At the mouth of the Congo there shall be founded, either on the initiative of the riverain Powers, or by the intervention of the International Commission, a quarantine establishment for the control of vessels passing out of as well as into the river.

Later on the Powers will decide whether and on what conditions a sanitary control shall be exercised over vessels engaged in the navigation of the river itself.

Article 25

The provisions of the present Act of Navigation shall remain in force in time of war. Consequently all nations, whether neutral or belligerent, shall be always free, for the purposes of trade, to navigate the Congo, its branches, affluents and mouths, as well as the territorial waters fronting the embouchure of the river.

Traffic will similarly remain free, despite a state of war, on the roads, railways, lakes and canals mentioned in Articles 15 and 16.

There will be no exception to this principle, except in so far as concerns the transport of articles intended for a belligerent, and in virtue of the law of nations regarded as contraband of war.

All the works and establishments created in pursuance of the present Act, especially the tax collecting offices and their treasuries, as well as the permanent service staff of these establishments, shall enjoy the benefits of neutrality (placés sous le régime de la neutralité), and shall, therefore, be respected and protected by belligerents.

CHAPTER V

ACT OF NAVIGATION FOR THE NIGER

Article 26

The navigation of the Niger, without excepting any of its branches and outlets, is and shall remain entirely free for the merchant ships of all nations equally, whether with cargo or ballast, for the transportation of goods and passengers. It shall be regulated by the provisions of this Act of Navigation, and by the rules to be made in pursuance of this Act.

In the exercise of this navigation the subjects and flags of all nations shall be treated, in all circumstances, on a footing of perfect equality, not only for the direct navigation from the open sea to the inland ports of the Niger, and vice versa, but for the great and small coasting trade, and for boat trade on the course of the river.

Consequently, on all the course and mouths of the Niger there will be no distinction made between the subjects of the riverain States and those of non-riverain States; and no exclusive privilege of navigation will be conceded to companies, corporations or private persons.

These provisions are recognized by the Signatory Powers as forming henceforth a part of international law.

Article 27

The navigation of the Niger shall not be subject to any restriction or obligation based merely on the fact of navigation.

It shall not be exposed to any obligation in regard to landing-station or depot, or for breaking bulk, or for compulsory entry into port.

In all the extent of the Niger the ships and goods in process of transit on the river shall be submitted to no transit dues, whatever their starting place or destination.

No maritime or river toll shall be levied based on the sole fact of navigation, nor any tax on goods on board of ships. There shall only be collected taxes or duties which shall be an equivalent for services rendered to navigation itself. The tariff of these taxes or duties shall not warrant any differential treatment.

Article 28

The affluents of the Niger shall be in all respects subject to the same rules as the river of which they are tributaries.

Article 29

The roads, railways or lateral canals which may be constructed with the special object of obviating the innavigability or correcting the imperfections of the river route on certain sections of the course of the Niger, its affluents, branches and outlets, shall be considered, in their quality of means of communication, as dependencies of this river, and as equally open to the traffic of all nations.

And, as on the river itself, so there shall be collected on these roads, railways and canals only tolls calculated on the cost of construction, maintenance and management, and on the profits due to the promoters.

As regards the tariff of these tolls, strangers and the natives of the respective territories shall be treated on a footing of perfect equality.

Article 30

Great Britain undertakes to apply the principles of freedom of navigation enunciated in Articles 26, 27, 28 and 29 on so much of the waters of the Niger, its affluents, branches and outlets, as are or may be under her sovereignty or protection.

The rules which she may establish for the safety and control of navigation shall be drawn up in a way to facilitate, as far as possible, the circulation of merchant ships.

It is understood that nothing in these obligations shall be interpreted as hindering Great Britain from making any rules of navigation whatever which shall not be contrary to the spirit of these engagements.

Great Britain undertakes to protect foreign merchants and all the trading nationalities on all those portions of the Niger which are or may be under her sovereignty or protection as if they were her own subjects, provided always that such merchants conform to the rules which are or shall be made in virtue of the foregoing.

Article 31

France accepts, under the same reservations, and in identical terms, the obligations undertaken in the preceding Articles in respect of so much of the waters of the Niger, its affluents, branches and outlets, as are or may be under her sovereignty or protection.

Article 32

Each of the other Signatory Powers binds itself in the same way in case it should ever exercise in the future rights of sovereignty or protection over any portion of the waters of the Niger, its affluents, branches or outlets.

Article 33

The arrangements of the present Act of Navigation will remain in force in time of war. Consequently, the navigation of all neutral or belligerent nationals will be in all time free for the usages of commerce on the Niger, its branches, its affluents, its mouths and outlets, as well as on the territorial waters opposite the mouths and outlets of that river.

The traffic will remain equally free in spite of a state of war on the roads, railways and canals mentioned in Article 29.

There will be an exception to this principle only in that which relates to the transport of articles destined for a belligerent, and considered, in virtue of the law of nations, as articles contraband of war.

CHAPTER VI

DECLARATION RELATIVE TO THE ESSENTIAL CONDITIONS TO BE OBSERVED IN ORDER THAT NEW OCCUPATIONS ON THE COASTS OF THE AFRICAN CONTINENT MAY BE HELD TO BE EFFECTIVE

Article 34

Any Power which henceforth takes possession of a tract of land on the coasts of the African continent outside of its present possessions, or which, being hitherto without such possessions, shall acquire them, as well as the Power which assumes a Protectorate there, shall accompany the respective act with a notification thereof, addressed to the other Signatory Powers of the present Act, in order to enable them, if need be, to make good any claims of their own.

Article 35

The Signatory Powers of the present Act recognize the obligation to insure the establishment of authority in the regions occupied by them on the coasts of the African continent sufficient to protect existing rights, and, as the case may be, freedom of trade and of transit under the conditions agreed upon.

CHAPTER VII

GENERAL DISPOSITIONS

Article 36

The Signatory Powers of the present General Act reserve to themselves to introduce into it subsequently, and by common accord, such modifications and improvements as experience may show to be expedient.

Article 37

The Powers who have not signed the present General Act shall be free to adhere to its provisions by a separate instrument.

The adhesion of each Power shall be notified in diplomatic form to the Government of the German Empire, and by it in turn to all the other signatory or adhering Powers.

Such adhesion shall carry with it full acceptance of all the obligations as well as admission to all the advantages stipulated by the present General Act.

Article 38

The present General Act shall be ratified with as little delay as possible, the same in no case to exceed a year.

It will come into force for each Power from the date of its ratification by that Power.

Meanwhile, the Signatory Powers of the present General Act bind themselves not to take any steps contrary to its provisions.

Each Power will address its ratification to the Government of the German Empire, by which notice of the fact will be given to all the other Signatory Powers of the present Act.

The ratifications of all the Powers will be deposited in the archives of the Government of the German Empire. When all the ratifications shall have been sent in, there will be drawn up a Deposit Act, in the shape of a Protocol, to be signed by the representatives of all the Powers which have taken part in the Conference of Berlin, and of which a certified copy will be sent to each of those Powers.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF the several plenipotentiaries have signed the present General Act and have affixed thereto their seals.

DONE at Berlin, the 26th day of February, 1885.

[Signatures included here.]